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L Introduction
During the 2000 Annual Meeting of United States Administrative Law Judges,'
Kenneth Apfel, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, engaged in
the following colloquy with one of the judges in attendance. The judge's question
begins the dialogue:
[Question]: With respect to your comments about decisional
independence, being your personal commitment and cornerstone, you
know I have been here since 1991 and I have heard your predecessors
and just about every representative that stood up there and make that
statement, but I've never seen one put in writing by the APA. Are you
willing to make the commitment in writing?
[Answer]: It is my understanding that you are.
[Question]: But nobody will put it in writing. I'm asking you, will
you?
[Answer]: Since I don't know exactly the implication of this action,
it is my understanding that the APA has been the boundaries that we
have worked within for years. I will, with Judge Bernowski, come up
with a specific thing on this issue. I don't know if there is a wrinkle
in here that I am unaware of. As I stand here today, the APA has been
a part of what I have always viewed as the roles and responsibilities
of our respective parties
This exchange highlights a debate not only within the Social Security Administration (SSA), but within other executive branch agencies relying upon federal
administrative law judges (ALJ) to resolve regulatory, enforcement, and benefits
cases. Succinctly stated, the debate focuses upon agency "management and
control" versus "judicial independence." At issue are the nature and status of ALJs
as well as the nature and character of the hearings they hold and the cases they
decide.
One writer has characterized the debate as focusing "on the role of the administrative law judge as a public servant .. . who must accomplish two
oftentimes conflicting goals."' The Administrative Law Judge has a unique

I. Held at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. in July 2000.
2. Transcript obtained from the Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge, Social Security
Administration.
3. Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences Between Judges in the Judicial Branch and
the Executive Branch: The Further Evolution of Executive Adjudications Under the Administrative
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understanding of a governmental agency's operations," the added benefit of formal
legal training, and is selected on the basis of more rigorous requirements than
required even of U.S. magistrate or bankruptcy judges! It is this unique combination of expertise and legal skill that makes the "typical AILJ."'
In addition to their unique abilities, the ALJ "is also responsible for conducting
hearings and rendering judgments."' These hearings and judgments, in fact, are
much like traditional adjudication While "[flamiliarity with the agency's policies
and its systems is useful in" fulfilling this task, the AJ "cannot simply defer to
the agency; the task at hand is to impartially adjudicate the controversy; even
though the outcome may be at odds with the result sought by agency."" It is this
tension that is at the core of the adjudicative role of the ALT.
If the ALJ "is to faithfully carry out her role as an adjudicator, [she] must strive
to be free of overreaching by the agency she is serving."'" In contrast to this need
for independence, it is likely that the ALJ "attained her judicial position in large
measure because she has a greater than average familiarity with the programs,
policies, and regulations of the agency, and is probably closely tied to the
government administrator charged with implementing those programs.""
Others have been more direct in their expression of the tension between an
agency and its ALJs, noting that many agency managers see the use of agency
review, even if it is de novo review, as ineffective to provide a check on the
independence of the ALJ.' While it is true that the threat of reversal on review
may shape some ALJ decisions, it does not "normally modify behavior as
effectively as the choice between conforming to a given norm and suffering direct
adverse consequences. Agencies, therefore, gaze lustfully at the forbiddenfruit of
performance evaluations.""
Nowhere has this tension been more evident than in SSA." In his January 31,

Central Panel, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 3 (1998).

4. Id. For example, the AU "may know foster care roles for the State of Oklahoma better than
virtually any judge or lawyer in her state; he may have been with the Social Security Administration
through cyclical contractions and expansions, acquiring along the way ahistory of legislative expressions
of intent that few can equal." Id.
5. See infra note 244.
6. McNeil, supra note 3. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. Like traditional adjudication, these hearings have "winners and losers, people lose
government benefits ... agencies find they must abandon long-standing approaches to can-ying out
fledgling and sometimes poorly thought-out legislation, and the public is at times left to wonder how the
AU ever came up with the decision." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluations, and Production
Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591,594-95
(1986).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Wendell Fennell & Fred Young, Judicial Independence Under Seige, 17 J. NAT'L
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 211 (1997). The authors observe:
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1997, memorandum on "The Duty of Impartiality in SSA Hearings and its Applicability to Administrative Law Judges," titled "Legal Foundations of the Duty
of Impartiality in the Hearing Process and its Applicability to Administrative Law
Judges," the General Counsel for the Social Security Administration commented:
SSA's and the claimant's ability to benefit from the highest quality and
most efficient service of the ALJ corps is undermined by the differing
and often contradictory understanding in various parts of the Agency
of... "decisional independence." This confusion exists about both the
meaning of "decisional independence," and the extent to which such
independence limits the otherwise appropriate authority of the Agency
to manage the performance of the ALT corps."
SSA General Counsel thus framed the question: to what extent may SSA
manage the performance of the ALJ corps? Inherent in the concept of
"management" is "control." During the 1980s, SSA "attempted to exercise control"
over ALJs in three respects: (1) it demanded greater ALJ productivity, (2) it
demanded greater consistency in ALJ decision making, and (3) it altered the
"proportion of cases in which they granted or denied benefits."' 6 "The primary
tool that the agency used for these purposes is familiar to all students of
is foreign to many judges
management science and quality control, but
7
statistical analysis of ALT decision making."
Importantly, a statistically based decision-making system, termed "bureaucratic,"
differs from a judicial system. "In ajudicialsystem, the quality of the decision and
the quality of justice depend on the quality of the judge. A bureaucraticsystem
depends on the quality of supervision and internal bureaucratic review.'. The two
systems are fundamentally opposed. That is not to say, however, that a middle
ground cannot be achieved. In an administrativejudicial system, the problem lies
in defining the nature and scope of the middle, such that neither the agency nor its
corps of judges is subsumed in the furtherance of the other's goals and objectives.

It is common knowledge that an absolute necessary element for the existence of an
impartial adjudicator is judicial independence. However, it is of great concern to all of

us who believe in the idea of impartiality and fairness that this necessary element of
judicial independence is under such intense attack. The attacks emanating from those
within the leadership roles of the administrative bureaucracies include the agencies' leaders
and the government attorneys (Offices of the General Counsel) in the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA) and Social Security Administration (SSA).
Id.
15. Memorandum from Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, to

the Social Security Administration Executive Staff (Jan. 31, 1997) (on file with author).
16. Richard J. Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias In Agency Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 483 (1990).
17. Id.
18. Ronnie Yoder & John Hardwicke, Yoder-Hardwicke Dialogue: Does Mandatory Quality
Assurance Oversight of AL Decisions Violate AL) DecisionalIndependence, Due Process or Ex Parte
Prohibitions?, 17 J.NArL ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 75, 76 (1997) (emphasis added).
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Succinctly, the problem is defined as "management and control" versus "judicial
independence."
The memorandum from SSA General Counsel asserts that "an Agency may take
reasonable actions to ensure that an ALU carries out his or her primary function
of hearing and deciding cases" and "can enforce standards to minimize defects in
decision-writing, ensure reasonable levels of productivity, and require appropriate
behavior in the course of adjudicatory proceedings."'" Two key issues come
immediately to mind: (1)the ability of the agency to assess ALJ compliance ("take
reasonable actions") and (2) the ability of the agency to act upon its assessment
("enforce standards").
For federal agencies and federal ALJs, the solution lies with the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)," as interpreted through legislative history and case law.
In one writer's view, the January 1997 memorandum' details a highly structured
and narrow reading of the APA that is "[p]reoccupied with viewing ALJs as
agency personnel subordinate to policy making officials in the hierarchy of
power. '" At the other end of the spectrum lies the view that describes AL.s in
the same terms as Article III judges within the federal judicial branch.'
A narrow interpretation of the APA, such that the ALJ is "subordinate to policy
making officials," replicates a bureaucratic system of adjudication, while an overly
broad interpretation endorses a pure judicial system. SSA, however, has adopted
an "administrative judicial system" - a judiciary within an executive branch
agency. Indeed, SSA administrative law judges far outnumber their counterparts
in every other executive branch combined, and SSA cases account for 95% of all
administrative adjudications each year, deciding more cases than the federal
judiciary.' Within this context, agency administrators nonetheless strive for a

19. Chater, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
20. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-

706).
21. See Victor Rosenblum, Toward Heightening Impartiality in Social Security Agency Proceedings
Involving Administrative Law Judges, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 58 (1998) (describing the

January 1997 memorandum as "[a] prototype of myopic perception" of administrative law judges and
their duties). He further states that the purpose of his article is "to examine the dysfunctionality of the
General Counsel's narrow conception of impartiality in his memorandum." Id.
22. Id. These comments are not lightly made. Professor Rosenblum is an acknowledged
administrative law scholar, serving as a consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States
and appearing before various congressional hearings. Over the past thirty years his reports and articles
appear as vital exhibits within the Congressional Record.
23. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978), wherein the Court observed that an administrative law judge is
"functionally comparable" to federal district judges in many respects), vacated by 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986).
24. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
258, 300 n.210 (1978) ("[In 1976] more than 625 SSA-AUs decided 180,000 disability cases; during
the same period 505 federal judges (including Justices of the Supreme Court) decided 130,000 cases.").
The numbers have continued to climb to this day. See Oversight of the Disability Appeals Process:
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
8 (1997) (noting that the number of appealed cases in 1995 was 548,000).
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narrow interpretation of the APA, while AI~s, responsively, argue for a broad
interpretation.
At issue is the reach of the APA. To shed light on the APA's reach, Part II of
this article will review the history of the APA. Part In will look to statutes and
legislative history to conclude that SSA administrative law judges are firmly
governed by the APA. Part IV will then explore the extent to which the APA
governs SSA hearings. Part V will outline the boundaries of the relationship
between SSA administrators and ALIJs under the APA, and Part VI will establish
that the APA does require ALJs as presiding officials in SSA hearings. Part VII
will highlight the ramifications of recognizing that the APA applies to social
security proceedings before ALJs, and Part VIII will conclude the article.
II. History of the Administrative ProcedureAct
The Administrative Procedure Act finds its genesis in a 1941 report from the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies. The Attorney General formed the committee to address "the controversy
over the lack of uniformity among agency hearing officers and the perceived
procedural unfairness of agency adjudication."' Indeed, the committee report
found that "[m]ost of the controversy over administrative procedure [had] centered
around formal adjudication."' The report found that each agency had its own
hearing methods, initial decision methods, and internal procedural structure.' It
also found that most agencies conducted evidence gathering in front of a board of
individuals or a single officer, which were selected in several different ways.'
The respective agencies titled these officers trial examiners, referees, presiding
officers, district engineers, deputy commissioners, or registers.'
In response to these findings, the committee recommended "a highly structured
system of 'hearing commissioners,' to be appointed by a newly created Office of
Federal Administrative Procedure.""'' The committee recommended that these
commissioners be appointed for seven-year terms and receive "'substantial' but
tiered salaries."3' The recommendations also noted the need "to establish a system
of hearing commissioners to handle all on-the-record adjudications."32 Through
the course of debate, a majority of the committee declined to adopt a proposed
code of administrative procedure, electing instead "to rely on the creation of the
hearing commissioner system and on the proposed new Office of Federal

25. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: APA-Adjudication: Is the
Questfor Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996).
26. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,

S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 43 (Ist Sess. 1941) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AoENCIEs].
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Lubbers, supra note 25, at 66.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Administrative Procedure to provide additional uniformity."' As ultimately
enacted, the APA reflects a "heavy reliance on a system of 'hearing examiners'
[now administrative law judges] and a rather prescriptive [albeit not inflexible] set
of formal hearing procedures, reflected in sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA [now
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557]."'
Notably, the committee contemplated at the outset that the decisions of the
"Social Security Board" (now the Social Security Administration) were to be
among those addressed by the soon-to-be enacted APA. This can be seen in the
findings of the committee report, which noted that "the Committee's recommendations in chapter III relating to informal adjudication are applicable to the initial
decisions rendered by the Social Security Board's staff; and the recommendations
in chapter IV relating to hearing commissioners are applicable to and largely
declaratory of the existing hearing proceedings before referees."'3 Chapter IV of
the committee report and the report's specific reference to the decisions of the
referees of the "Social Security Board" support this conclusion.
Indeed, the proceedings of the Social Security Board established a model for the
procedures to be recommended as part of the APA.' Specifically, the committee
report declared that hearings before administrative agencies must constitute an
"objective appraisal of the facts and the furtherance of the public duty."" The
report found that this process must be led by an official "who shall command
public confidence both by his capacity to grasp the matter at issue and by his
impartiality in dealing with it."' The committee report then recommended that
"these officials should be men of ability and prestige, and should have a tenure and
a salary which will give assurance of independence of judgement.""'
The committee report further recommended that "Commissioners should be fully
empowered by statute to preside at hearings, issue subpoenas, administer oaths,
rule of upon motions, carry out other duties incident to the proper conduct of
hearings, and make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders for the
disposition of matters coming before them."'
Importantly, "[t]he hearing
commissioners should be a separate unit in each agency's organization. They
should have no functions other than those of presiding at hearings or prehearing

33. Id.
34. Id. at 67.
35. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 26, at 157.
36. The report noted that "the recommendations in chapter IV relating to hearing commissioners are
applicable to and largely declaratory of the existing hearing proceedings before referees." Id. See also
SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. 96TH CONG., SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, 6-7 (Comm. Print 1979)
[hereinafter SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER) ("Mhe Attorney General's committee which was primarily
responsible for the form of the APA used Social Security Act procedures as a model and considered the
APA 'largely declaratory' of its provisions.").
37. See ADMINISTRATIVE P4REDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 26, at 43.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Id. at 50.
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negotiations and of initially deciding the cases which fall within the agency's
jurisdiction."'"
With the passage of the APA, the contemplated Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure was not created. Instead, the functions of overseeing the hearing
examiner program went to the Civil Service Commission, now the Office of
Personnel Management.'
In unanimously passing the APA, however, Congress largely adopted the
recommendations of the committee regarding the status of the "hearing commissioner," termed by the act "hearing examiners," and preserved the fundamental
hallmarks of objectivity defined by independence and impartiality.' 3
The legislative history of the APA, principally embodying the 1941 report from
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, thus clearly
contemplates (1) that the decisions made by the Social Security Board would be
among those addressed by the later-enacted APA and (2) that the officials making
those decisions would be "hearing examiners" appointed in accord with the
APA."
I!. Are United States Administrative Law Judges Assigned to the Social
Security Administration "APA Judges?"

The question of whether federal ALJs assigned to the Social Security Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals are "APA judges" is straightforward.
It is best addressed by reference to the applicable statutes and their implementing
regulations.
A. Governing Statutes and Regulations

Title 5, section 554 of the APA addresses "adjudications," and requires that
notice be given prior to a hearing."5 In doing so, the APA mirrors the requirements of the Social Security Act by requiring that notice be given to a party

41. Id.
42. LLOYD D. MusoLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
139-72 (1979).

43. Arthur Fried, Panel Discussion on Independence and the Federal AL): Fried, Bernowski, 18 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 47, 49 (1998) ("Congress sought to achieve two fundamental goals: to
eliminate agency control over the classification, discipline and conflict with hearing examiners... and
to separate the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, which previously resided in the same person in

some agencies.").
44. See Verkuil, supra note 24, at 312. Verkuil notes, as a foregone conclusion, the applicability

of the APA to Social Security Administration administrative law judges:
More than half of all AUs - those assigned to the Social Security Administration decide more than 80 percent of all administrative cases in distinctly non-adversary fashion.
Since these decisions meet APA requirements, they denmonstrate that even the definition
of fornal adjudication is susceptible to radically different interpretations.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971)).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000).
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of the time and place of the hearing, the nature of hearing, and notice of the issues
of law in question.'
Section 556 provides: "There shall preside at the taking of evidence - (1) the
agency; (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency; or (3)
one or more administrative law judges appointed under section 3105 of this
title.' 4 Title 5, section 3105 of the APA further provides:
Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with
sections 556 and 557 of this title. Administrative law judges shall be
assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform
duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges."
Significantly, 5 U.S.C. § 5372 specifically defines "administrative law judges" as
appointed solely under § 3105.' No other type of federal "administrative law
judge" can exist under federal law.
Section 5372 then describes the "3 levels of basic pay for administrative law
judges [designated as AL-1, AL-2, and 3, respectively]," ' further providing that
"[tihe Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe regulations necessary to
administer this section.'' These sections make clear that ALJs serving within
SSA are appointed under and in accord with the APA.
Indeed, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has accepted jurisdiction
in proposed agency action against administrative law judges assigned to SSA.5
Accepting jurisdiction is appropriate given that these officials were, in fact,
appointed under the board's auspices." The authority of the MSPB to accept
jurisdiction is derived directly from § 1305 of the APA, which provides that the
MSPB "may investigate" the claims of A.Js.'

46. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2000).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
48. Id. § 3105 (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 5372(a). Section 3105 reads: "For the purposes of this section, the term 'administrative law
judge' means an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105." Id.
50. Id. § 5372(b)(I)(A).
51. Id. § 5372(c).
52. See, e.g., Soc. See. Admin. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Clover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984);
Soc. Sec. Admin. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984); Soc. Sec.
Admin. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Brennan, 19 M.S.P.R. 35 (1984).
53. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 52.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000). Specifically, § 1305 provides:
For the purpose of sections 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(D), and 5372 of this title and the
provisions of section 5335(a)(B) of this title that relate to administrative law judges, the
Office of Personnel Management may, and for the purpose of section 7521 of this title,
the Merit Systems Protection Board may investigate, prescribe regulations, appoint
advisory committees as necessary, recommend legislation, subpena [sic] witnesses and
records, and pay witness fees as established for the courts of the United States.
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Furthermore, § 7521(a) limits the ability of an agency to remove an ALJ,
requiring that the MSPB, and not the agency, find "good cause established and
determined ... on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board.""
Interestingly, for purposes of the APA, the term "employee" is defined as "an
individual employed in or under an agency, but does not include . . . an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title." An "agency,"
however, is defined "for the purpose of this subchapter" as "an Executive agency,
except a government corporation and the General Accounting Office.""7 SSA is
not otherwise excluded from this definition and falls within the ambit of the
statute, including those provisions, outlined above, pertaining to ALJs. Indeed,
such has been the course of custom and practice of the agency since the inception
of the APA.'
The definition of "coverage" in section 351.202 of the APA includes ALJs
"except as modified by Part 930 of this chapter."' Under part 930, ALJs are
excluded from those provisions relating to performance evaluation.'
Finally, OPM's implementing regulations require it to "conduct competitive
examinations for administrative law judge positions,"' and further defines an AJ
as "a position in which any portion of the duties includes those which require the
appointment of an administrative law judge under 5 U.S.C. 3105. ' 2 This same
regulation further provides for detail, promotion, reinstatement, and removal of
ALs.' As the court in Stieberger v. Heckler' stated, only one conclusion can
be reached: "The ALJ is a creature of statute, specifically the APA."'

55. Id. § 7521(a).
56. Id. § 4301.
57. Id. § 3132.

58. For a discussion of legislative history, see discussion infra Part 111.B.
59. 5 C.F.R. § 351.202 (2001). The regulation reads:
(a) Employees covered. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this pan
applies to each civilian employee in:
(I) The executive branch of the Federal Government; and
(2) Those parts of the Federal Government outside the executive branch which are
subject by statute to competitive service requirements or are determined by the appropriate
legislative or judicial administrative body to be covered hereunder. Coverage includes
administrative law judges except as mrdified by Part 930 of this chapter.

Id. (second emphasis added).
60. The regulation reads:
(a) Actions covered. This part covers reduction in grade and removal of employees
based on unacceptable performance.
(b) Actions excluded. This part does not apply to: ...
(6) An action taken under 5 U.S.C. 7521 against an administrative law judge.
5 C.F.R. § 432.102 (2001).
61. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2001).
62. Id. § 930.202(c).
63. Id. § 930.202(b), (d)-(f).
64. 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated by 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1985).
65. Id. at 1386; see also Sprague v. King. 825 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. III. 1993), affd, 23 F.3d 185

(7th Cir. 1994). The court in Stieberger went on to state:
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Statutorily, then, ALJs serving in SSA, appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and its
implementing regulations, are APA judges. Their appointment and tenure are
regulated by the Office of Personnel Management, as contemplated by the 1941
committee report of the Attorney General and in accord with the APA as finally
enacted.
B. Legislative History
Nowhere is the question of APA status more directly addressed than in the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) legislation. And, nowhere is the agency's firm
commitment to the applicability of the APA to social security hearings more
evident than in the ensuing debate over the appointment of new ALJs to hear SSI
cases.
The law that established the SSI program was signed by President Richard M.
Nixon on October 30, 1972.' On November'16, 1972, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) requested that the Civil Service Commission
establish registers for ALJs to hear SSI cases.' "The Department's request
touched off an incredible series of developments.""
The Office of Administrative Law Judges of the Civil Service Commission took
the position that SSA did not require that SSI hearings be held under the APA, and
"therefore the Commission was powerless to act."" In contrast, HEW took the
position that the APA did apply, finally convincing the chairman of the commission. In late October 1973, the chairman "granted the HEW request to establish
registers for administrative law judges.'7 In response, ALJs "from 'old line'

The AU's independence is provided for by several employment-related provisions of the
APA: they are paid in accordance with Office of Personnel Management guidelines set
independently of agency recommendations or ratings (5 U.S.C. § 5372); they am exempt
from performance appraisals to which other federal employees are subject (5 U.S.C. §
4301(2)(D)); an agency must establish good cause, after providing the AU with an
opportunity for a hearing before an independent body (the Merit Systems Protection
Board), in order to take adverse action against an AU (5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)). Although the
APA does not provide tenure and compensation protections equivalent to those provided
for under Article Ill of the Constitution, the AJ is more protected in these respects than
other federal employees.
Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1386.
66. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., COMM. STAFF REPORT ON THE DISABILITY
INSURANCE PROGRAM 55 (Comm. Staff Report 1974) [hereinafter DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM],
microformed on CIS No.H782-29 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. The report further stated:
On October 30, 1973, upon the recommendation of the Commission's Deputy Executive
Director, Chairman Hampton signed and dispatched a letter to HEW Secretary
Weinberger, in which he said in conclusion: "In summary, the Commission is willing to
establish the SSI positions in the GS-935 series (Administrative Law Judges), to consider
any further information the Department has relative to grade level on the subject positions,
and to initiate a recruitment program in line with the standards now followed in the
Administrative Law Judge program."
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agencies" objected and requested a full hearing before the commission," The
commission convened this hearing on December 3, 1973." Several of HEW's top
officials, along with HEW ALJs and representatives from the HEW Administrative
Law Section of the American Bar Association, attended the hearing."
The chairman of the commission framed the following question:
The question then becomes: (1)
what did Congress intend? (2) in the
absence of a clear Congressional intent, what then becomes legally
necessary through other statutes, court decisions, etc., in terms of
structure, procedure, and presiding hearing examiner to conduct SSI
hearings? and (3) what is administratively desirable in order to afford
due process to claimants - due process that will withstand judicial
scrutiny - and in order to enable HEW to carry out in an expeditious
and orderly fashion a new public program established by Congress and
reflecting the will of the people?'
In response, HEW Commissioner Hess "urged that full APA procedures be
applied under SSI as under SSA - that the Department and the Commission
should not create artificial distinctions between types of due process accorded
climaints [sic] under the two programs."" HEW officials cited the statements of
House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, whose committee handled the
original bill in the House, stating on the house floor that "all of the safeguards for
a fair and equitable hearing in the APA would apply to these hearings."7' Indeed,
in a January 24, 1973, letter from the Chief Counsel for the House Ways and
Means Committee, to H. Dale Cook, Director of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals, the Chief Counsel "summed up the legislative history on this question

Id. at 62.
71. Id. at 58.
72. Id. at 62.
73. Id. Those in attendance included SSA Deputy Commissioner Arthur Hess; H. Dale Cook,
Director, SSA's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals; Sumner G. Whittier, Director, SSA's Aged, Blind and
Disabled Office of Planning Assistance; and HEW Assistant General Counsel Manuel Hiller. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id. The long-held, contrary position of the Ways and Means Committee was reiterated in the
1974 staff report that read:
The legislative history of the law establishing the SSI program makes it clear that the
committee intended that the hearings conducted under the new program are to be under
the APA .... In a confidential print prepared by HEW and Ways and Means staff
(February 8, 1971) which described proposed Administration amendments to H.R. I the
following appears:
Under the provisions of H.R. I, all hearing examiners must be qualified under the
standards in the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. at 56. Notable is the discussion which accompanied the bill, to the effect that the hearings would be
APA protected, but, over recruitment concerns, it was debated whether hearing examiners would be APA
qualified. Id. Ultimately, however, no reference was made in the act to that effect. Id. HEW maintained
its position that its decision makers would be APA-qualified. Id.
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[stating that] ... all hearings are to be conducted in accordance with the APA.""
HEW "urged the Commissioners to endorse HEW's determination to accord a
lowly private citizen - a welfare recipient - the same rights as the Government
accords a powerful corporation in contested matters: namely, the right to appear
before an Administrative Law Judge under the full rights and protection of the
Administrative Procedure Act."'"
On December 14, 1973, Chairman Hampton dispatched the Commission's final
decision, concluding "that administrative law judges are not required to preside
over SSI hearings because the program is not under the APA."'
Though the battle was lost in 1973, the war was far from over. While the
agency was forced to employ "temporary ALJs,' it continued to push for APAqualified ALJs, striving to put its temporary, non-APA (not appointed by the Civil
Service Commission) title XVI judges on an equal footing with those hearing cases
under title II and title XVIII of the Social Security Act. The Subcommittee On
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means issued its "Social Security
Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper" on January 27, 1979,
recounting the events of the preceding several years:"
From a legal standpoint, the question of APA applicability has been
put to rest. After the hearings in the fall of 1975, the Ways and Means
Committee reported legislation which explicitly put the SSI and social
security programs on the same basis as far as hearings and appeals
are concerned. The House report stated:
The bill eliminates the distinction in the nature of hearings and
hearing officers under the Social Security and SSI programs, thus
resulting in a common corps of hearing officers authorized to conduct
hearings under both programs with common procedural safeguards
provided under the Social Security Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act. This is necessary to override an interpretation of the
Civil Service Commission that the Administrative Procedure Act was
not applicable to SSI hearings and which required the appointment of
non-APA hearings officers who could not hear Social Security and
Medicare cases. This action greatly exacerbated the current hearing
crisis and the validity of the SSI hearings has been challenged in the

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
Section 3 of Public Law 94-202 provided, in-part:
The persons appointed under section 1631(d)(2) of the Social Security Act . . . may
conduct hearings under titles II, XVI and XVIII of [this chapter] ... notwithstanding the
fact that their appointments were made without meeting the requirements for hearing
examiners appointed under section 3105 of title 5, United States Code but their
appointments shall terminate not later than at the close of the period ending December 31,
1978.
Social Security Act Amendments of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-202, § 3, 89 Stat. 1135.
81. Id.
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Courts as second class justice. The Committee bill will put this matter
to rest by clearly providing on-the-record administrative hearings and
judicial review of a parallel nature for Social Security, SS! and
Medicare claimants.'
The subcommittee also took note of the 1977 report of the Center for Administrative Justice, which supported the APA hearing system." The 1977 report
concluded that the "public trust in the SSA scheme of social insurance would be
undermined significantly were the opportunity for a face-to-face encounter with a
demonstrably independent decision maker eliminated from the system."' While
acknowledging that independence did not necessarily depend on ALJs being
subject to the APA, the report concluded that other alternatives would be costly
and unpredictable." The Administrative Conference of the United States echoed
a similar theme, stating that "[tjhe use of administrative law judges appointed in
conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act to decide disability claims
should be continued.""
The passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1383 ended this long-standing debate. The section
provided:
The persons who were appointed to serve as hearing examiners under
section 1631(d)(2) of the Social Security Act ... and who by section
3 of Public Law 94-202 were deemed to be appointed under section
3105 of title 5, United States Code (with such appointments terminating no later than at the close of the period ending December 31,
1978), shall be deemed appointed, to career-absolute positions as
hearing examiners under and in accordance with section 3105 of title
5, United States Code, with the same authority and tenure as hearing
examiners appointed directly under such section 3105 ...
Any question about the status of ALJs assigned to SSA was thus firmly resolved.
Congress, by affirmative legislative fiat, exercised its authority and specifically
determined that those who decide benefits cases under titles II, XVI and XVIII of
the Social Security Act are APA decision makers.
IV. Does the APA Govern Social Security Administration Hearings?
Given the foregoing discussion, it almost goes without saying that if those who
preside over a proceeding are APA-qualified, then the proceeding itself falls under
the ambit of the APA. A brief discussion, however, is important.

82. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 9 (emphasis added).

83. Id. at 10.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. Social Security Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1559.
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Since the inception of the APA, commentators have debated whether, because
of their informal nature, hearings conducted under the Social Security Act merit
APA status.U This was never actually an issue for those serving on the Attorney
General's Committee On Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies.
Indeed, the Social Security Board and the Veterans Administration were lauded for
handling a significant caseload through informal processes."
At the heart of the matter is the often misunderstood impact of the APA on the
hearings process. For lawyers and judges educated in the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, the hearings process conducted by AL~s assigned to SSA seems
less fair, or even less judicially demanding than the adversarial system of contested
dispute resolution and thus not subject to APA status. Traditionally, it is the
adversarial process, and not the inquisitorial process, that our society has seen as

fair and just."
It is clear, however, that the framers of the APA did not intend any one process
to be the hallmark of adjudication under the APA." Quite the opposite is true.
The report from the Attorney General's Commission on Administrative Procedure
in Government Agencies found that "a proper and fair forum" under the APA
could be achieved by several methods." The report noted that a proper and fair
forum required an "open and fair atmosphere and a receptive presiding officer.
[one who is] ... able, independent, and responsible . . , The committee

88. For example, a 1978 GAO Report, quoting the Research Director of the Administrative
Conference, stated that "some cases now adjudicated formally by AU's may not need the formality of
the APA to provide due process, while others now adjudicated informally may need the additional
formality." SURvEY AND ISSUE PAPER. supra note 36, at 10; see also ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. supra note 26, at 157.
89. Though the Committee recognized that the number of decisions that the Social Security Board
must make are too numerous to be formalized, it did so in recognition of the fact that many individuals
are "assisted in the preparation and development of his claim by representatives of the agency accessible
to him in the field." ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN .GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 26, at 38.
Of note is the fact that the overwhelming number of persons then appearing before the Board were
unrepresented. See Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers... and
Poor People Too, 40 MIss. L.J. 24 (1968). It now may be argued that the decisional circumstance is at
present different from that earlier time. Now, between 80-90% of all claimants are represented, and the
hearings process has become far more judicialized. See Peer Review Report, 2001, Memorandum from
Associate Commissioner A. Jacy Thurmond (May 21, 2002) (noting that "pro se claimants made up 17
percent of FY 2001 decisions") (on file with author). The increase in de novo hearings before AUs,
when coupled with heightened scrutiny by the federal courts, further strengthens the continuing role of
the administrative law judge.
90. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Usa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative
Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293
(1997).
91. Verkuil, supra note 24, at 312. The author writes: "[Miore than half of all AU's - those
assigned to the Social Security Administration - decide more than 80 percent of all administrative cases
in distinctly non-adversarial fashion. Since these decisions meet APA requirements, they demonstrate that
even the definition of formal adjudication is susceptible to radically different interpretations." Id.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
92. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 26, at 69.
93. Id.
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also concluded that fairness required "that the hearing be conducted in an orderly
and dignified manner. This does not mean, however, that formality is a prere-

quisite.".' In fact, the report noted several instances when formality would hinder
rather than help the process."5
Then-Director of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Robert Trachtenberg,
expressed a similar view in a hearing before the Subcommittee on Social
Security." Director Trachtenberg did not believe that the APA required "an
adversary proceeding or highly 'judicialized' hearing."" He stated that "[tihere is
nothing in my view that says that an APA proceeding... necessarily must be an
adversary procedure where you have the traditional legal counsel on one side
representing the Government and counsel representing the other party.""
Professor Victor Rosenblum, of Northwestern University Law School, endorsed
similar views when he testified before the subcommittee. He stated that "[tihe
focus of the APA was not on judicialization but on fairness and impartiality in
wielding administrative skills and responsibilities. .

.

. Those who fear that

Administrative Law Judges appointed pursuant to the APA will rigidify and
judicialize our administrative proceedings misconstrue the history, purposes and
practices of APA hearing officers."" Testifying further, Professor Rosenblum
noted that the APA specifically provided for other types of proceedings,
particularly in benefits cases, than those which are strictly judicialized in the form
of traditional court proceedings." Continuing in his testimony before the
subcommittee, Professor Rosenblum pointed to the Horsky Report, undertaken in

94. Id.
95. Id. The report noted that
in cases such as those coming before the Social Security Board, the Veterans' Administration, and the Railroad Retirement Board, strict formality would hinder the
claimants, who often represent themselves and who should be encouraged to tell their own
stories as simply and as naturally as possible. There, the atmosphere of sympathetic
conversation is best conducive to proper administration.
Id.
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9. Professor Rosenblum testified:
Applicants for benefits ...may not... need, however, to confront witnesses, crossexamine them or present oral testimony. Section 556(d) removes any danger whatever that
over-judicialization of benefits hearings will stem from their inclusion under the APA.
There should be extensive use and expansion of the scope of application of §556(d) to
speed agency hearing processes as well as expansion of APA Administrative Law Judges
to assure requisite impartiality and professional skill.
Id. Section 556(d) provides in part:
A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining claimsfor money or
benefits . . .an agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written form.
5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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1960, which specifically found that the non-adversary Social Security Act hearing
did not violate the APA. 0' Edward Yourman, former HEW Assistant General
Counsel and recognized by the Subcommittee as having "conducted a major study
of the Social Security appeals process," reached the same conclusion."0 He noted
that the differences between Social Security hearings and other hearings governed
by the APA did "not justify an exception to the general policy of making
adjudicatory hearings subject to APA requirements, including those to assure
impartiality of decisions by ALJ's.""
While the Supreme Court has declined to specifically comment on the question
of the applicability of the APA to Social Security hearings, a spate of cases in the
early 1970s raised several questions.' In a report to the administrative conference, presented to the Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on
Ways and Means, Professor Rosenblum surveyed the issues raised by a succession
of Supreme Court decisions." He noted that the then-recent cases of Richardson
°
v. Perales,"'
Richardson v. Wright,'"' Arnett v. Kennedy," and Withrow v.
Larkin" could be "seen as new authority and justification for separating
adversary administrative proceedings deemed to warrant application of both due
process and APA protections from non-adversary proceedings, especially benefits
cases, deemed to qualify only for the lower level of protection provided by a
situationally varying due process.""0..
However, Congress's subsequent action in passing Public Law 95-216, which
reaffirmed the appointment of APA-qualified ALJs in the SSI program, makes
plain that equal status under the APA must be given to benefits programs as well
as other adversary administrative proceedings. Close review of the Social Security
statute and, in particular the original SSI legislation itself, confirms congressional
intent to apply the APA in SSI hearings. Professor Rosenblum explained that
"[tihe implicit requirement [of section 405(g)] that there be a hearing on the record

101. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 9. Professor Rosenblum testified:
The 1960 Covington and Buding study of the appeals system (the Horsky report) found
that the non-adversary Social Security Act hearing did not violate section 5(c) or I I of
the APA and "is not to be construed to put unsuspected and impossible barriers in the way
of a fair adjudicative process, whatever may be its formal trappings."
Id.
102. Id. at 9 n.3.
103. Id. at 9.
104. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 387 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
105. SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG.,
RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS CRISIS 171 (Comm. Print

1975) (Victor Rosenblum) (hereinafter RECENT STUDIES].
106. 402 U.S. 387 (1971).
107. 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
108. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).

109. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
110. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 212.
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then triggers the need to appoint AJs pursuant to § 3105 of the APA."M'
Neither Richardson v. Perales nor Sims v. Apfel"' challenged this view."3 In
Perales, the Court declined to directly address the coverage of the APA, though
it acknowledged that the Social Security Act mirrored the procedural requirements
of the APA."4 One writer wrote that in endorsing the "three-hat" role of ALJs
in the inquisitorial benefits hearing, the Court enhanced the role of the AL, while
accepting the informal structure of the proceeding.Is
This same author went on to note that "[bly presiding over informal, non-lawyer
dominated hearings, ALJs departed from their traditional association with the trialtype process.... Nevertheless, different though it may have been, this category
expanded the ALJs' use dramatically..". Thus, Perales recognized that the APA
did not require the formal adjudicatory proceedings contemplated by adversarial
administrative undertakings."'

II1. Id. at 217.
112. 530 U.S. 103 (2000).

113. See RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 218. Professor Rosenblum opines:
It is significant in this respect that the Solicitor General [in his reply brief in Perales]
did not urge that the APA was inapplicable to hearings of disability claims under the
Social Security Act but argued explicitly that "the broad question of general applicability"
of the APA to such hearings "is of no consequence here. For, assuming its applicability,
the Administrative Procedure Act specifically authorized the procedures which the
Secretary follows under the Social Security Act." Given the Solicitor General's position
and the Supreme Court's assertion in agreement that "we need not decide whether the
APA has general application to Social Security disability claims," one would have to be
unmitigatedly obtuse and perverseto contend that any alterationof the scope of the APA 's
coverage was embodied in or contemplated by the Perales case.

Id. (emphasis added).
114. Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine
to InquisitorialAdministrative Proceedings,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997). Professor Dubin states:

"In sustaining the SSA's inquisitorial model, the Court specifically declined to address whether the APA's
adjudication provisions apply to SSA hearings. It reasoned that 'social security administrative procedure
does not vary from that prescribed by the APA' and that 'the latter [was] modeled upon the Social
Security Act.'" Id. at 1306 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
115. Verkuil, supra note 24, at 286. The author notes:
The Court approved the so-called "three-hat" administrative law judge (claimant-representative, government representative and neutral decider), whose conduct has been seen to
emulate that of inquisitorial judge[s] in continental countries.
This view challenges the dominance of the adversary model of administrative
procedure and at the same time confirms tradition. One would think the power of an AU
to control the course of litigation is enhanced by the Perales decision.
Id.
116. Paul R. Verkuil, ContemporaryIssues in AdministrativeAdjudication: Article and Commentary:
Reflections Upon the FederalAdministrative Judiciary,39 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1349 (1992).

117. Verkuil observes:
The three hat role was necessitated by the fact that in those days there were few
attorneys for claimants and none representing the government. Obviously had the formal

hearing requirements of the APA been mandatory, the separation of functions requirements would have forbidden the AU to assume total control of the process.
Id. at 1349 n.32.
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In Sims v. Apfel, the Court addressed the question of administrative issue
exhaustion, noting that "SSA regulations do not require issue exhaustion."...
Contrasting the adversarial administrative proceeding with "an administrative
proceeding [that] is not adversarial," the Court concluded that "the reasons.., to
require issue exhaustion [in the non-adversarial proceeding] are much weaker.""1 9
The Court described the nonadversary Social Security proceeding as departing
from the "judicial model of decision making."'' " The Court found that the Social
Security proceeding modified the adversarial system by "replacement of normal
adversary procedure [with] . . . the 'investigatory model.".' Absent in the
investigatory model is "[tihe adversarial development of issues by the parties the 'com[ing] to issue' on which that analogy depends simply does not exist."'"
However, at no point did the Court implicate the APA, concluding simply that
"'the general rule [of issue exhaustion] makes little sense in this particular
context.""" The Court noted, however, that nothing prevented the commissioner
from adopting "a regulation that did require issue exhaustion. "2"
Recent circuit decisions emphasize the applicability of APA standards to the
hearings process in benefits-determination cases. In Young v. Apfel,' the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
[wjhile we have often stated that ...the Commissioner has the burden
at step five ...we have not had the opportunity to say what that

There remains the question of how the Court would regard the current environment had the APA issue
raised in Peralesbeen urged in Sims. The world of 1971 differed, in that lawyers were not dominant in
such proceedings then, as they are now; which leaves open the question of whether a stricter view of the
APA and its requirement for separation of functions might curtail the "three hat" role in light of the
significant increase in activity of counsel in benefits hearings.
In hearings before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means in
March 1986, SSA responded to specific questioning by the subcommittee as to the now-defunct
government representation "experiment." The changing legal environment facing AUs assigned to SSA
was described by the agency itself:
Under the traditional SSA hearing process the AU must function as case developer,
advocate for the interest and rights of both the claimant and the public, and adjudicator.
However, the increased caseloads of today have limited the time available to AUs for
developing evidence and other preheating case preparation, and vastly increased claimant
representation has substantially altered the role of the AU by decreasing his or her role
as advocate for the claimant and increasing the role of advocate for the public.
Current Problems in the Social Security Hearingsand AppeaLs Process: Hearing BeJbre the Subcomm.
On Social Security of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 85 (1986) [hereinafter Current
Problems].
118. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 108 (2000).
119. Id.at I10.
120. Id.(quoting 2 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J.PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREAnSE § 9.10, at 103 (3d ed. 1994)).
121. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1975)).
122. Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
123. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Harwood v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1999)).
124. Id. at 108.
125. No. 98-6411, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27918 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1999).
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burden is. Though the Social Security Act does not specify the
appropriate standard, we agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that there is "no doubt that the preponderance of the evidence is the
proper standard, as it is the default standard in civil and administrative
proceedings."'"

The Tenth Circuit specifically noted "that [the] standard of proof under [the]
Administrative Procedures Act is [the] 'traditional' preponderance standard.'' 27

The Young court further noted the "similarity in administrative procedure between
[the] Social Security Act and APA."' ' It concluded that "a claimant's burden .
. is to show the existence of particular facts. . . is more likely than the nonexistence of those facts" and that "an AU must make his or her findings using the
preponderance standard."'' The court thus affirmed that the APA preponderance
standard applies in Social Security proceedings, even though such proceedings are
nonadversarial.
Ultimately, the fundamental role of the AU assigned to the Social Security
Administration is adjudicatory, not adversarial.' This finding does not affect the
application of the APA to such proceedings nor does it affect the requirement that
AUs preside over these hearings. The mandate of the APA is that a citizen be
afforded a process which is fair and impartial; not that it be in any particular form
or possess a given formality. It is fairness and impartiality that mark the APA
standard, and it is these hallmarks that the APA modeled from the Social Security
Act, not the form or formality of the proceeding itself.'

126. Id. at *5(citations omitted) (quoting Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir.
1996)).
127. Id. at *5-6 (citing Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98-102 (1981)).
128. Id. at *6 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971)).
129. Id.
130. The court in Richardson v. Perales observed: "We bear in mind that the agency operates
essentially, and is intended so to do. as an adjudicator and not as an advocate or adversary. This is the
congressional plan. We do not presume on this record to say that it works unfairly." Perales, 402 U.S.
at 403.
131. Professor Rosenblum noted:,
The review in the course of this paper of key administrative law decisions shows that
Frankfurter's conception of the administrative process as a "more flexible" instrument has
prevailed and that the APA has been construed to implement his view rather than to cast
the agencies into rigid judicial molds. Despite the judiciary's encouragement of
administrative flexibility and discretion, fears continue to be voiced - as in the battle
over the status of SSI hearing officers - that APA applicability is to be equated with
judicial rigidification of the administrative process.
The focus of the APA was not on judicialization but on fairness and impartiality in
the wielding of administrative expertise. It was never intended or provided that the
formalism of the courtroom should pervade the APA hearing. The sine qua non to the
APA hearingwas impartialityof the hearing officer, as Wong Yang Sung and its progeny
proclaimed.
All Americans are entitled to fair and impartial treatment by their governmental
agencies, andfairnessfosters both the doing and accepting of justice.
RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 243-44 (emphasis added).
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V. What Boundaries Outline the Relationship of SSA Administrators to SSA
Administrative Law Judges Under the Administrative ProcedureAct?

Just as fairness and impartiality are the cornerstones of an APA hearing, so
independence and impartiality are the corollary benchmarks of the AU. As
envisioned by the drafters of the APA, fairness could not exist absent the independence of the decision maker. 3 To ensure fairness, the framers of the APA
required the independence of the AUJ, "to further preclude the possibility of
agency pressure or influence . . . ." 3 While the APA places ALJs within

individual agencies, the purpose was not to give the agency "management and
control" over the judge; such action was viewed as inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of the act. Instead, it was thought that insulating the agencies from
management and control at the outset would end such temptation. As noted in a
1951 attorney general's opinion, "[ilf salaries and promotions are subject to agency
control, there is always danger that a subtle influence will be exerted upon the
examiners to decide in accordance with agency wishes. The committee reports
demonstrate the intention of the Congress to minimize this hazard.""lN
"Subtle influences" were thus recognized early on as insidious and a danger to
the foundational principles of the APA. In fact, Professor Rosenblum argued that
"[tihe significant professional status of ALJs today has been made possible in large
measure by their independence from agency and political pressures."'35 Professor
Rosenblum framed the problem as agency management seeking "to impose upon
judges usual agency control systems that are, in fact, inappropriate, costly and
unnecessary if not altogether illegal."'"
He further noted that agency
management sought to impose these controls because they viewed "ALJs as
'subordinate employees to be managed and controlled."""
The reason for the placement of hearing examiners (later, administrative law
judges) within the agency was not to allow the agency to "manage and control"
their judges, but to permit agency control over the very limited question of
staffing." The legislative history of section 11, as seen in the report of the
132. Senate Report 95-697 notes:
Hearing examiners, [now designated Administrative Law Judges (AU's) pursuant to Civil
Service Regulation] are an integral part of the rule making and adjudicatory procedures
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 [now codified at 5 U.S.C.
551 et seq.]. To insure the independence and impartiality of the administrative process,
section 556 of title 5 requires AU's to serve as presiding officers with respect to rule
making or adjudicatory hearings (unless the agency itself, or one or more of its members,
presides).
S. REP. No. 95-697, at 2 (1978).
133. Id.

134. Administrative Procedure Act, Promotion of Hearing Examiners, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 78
(1951).
135. REcENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 240.
136. Id. at 24041.
137. Id. at 240 (quoting Statement and Recommendation of the Federal Administrative Law Judges
Conference to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, Dec. 1973, 7).
138. See id.
at 227. Professor Rosenblum writes:
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House Judiciary Committee, makes the agency's limited role in the management
and control of ALs clear. The report noted that while the Commission may
consult with an agency on setting up positions, it would ultimately act on its own,
"with the objects of the bill in mind.'. 3. A later report from the same committee
noted that "AU management was kept to a minimum and was placed, along with
the task of AL recruitment outside the agency and in the Civil Service Commission [now the Office of Personnel Management]."'' " The same report further
noted that "[algencies are not, at any time, permitted to appraise AU performance."'41
The legislative history of the APA manifests an intent to separate ALJs from the
management functions of their respective agencies. Close reading of the APA and
its implementing regulations show that it is the Office of Personnel Management
(or, formerly, the CSC) that has an actual, statutory mandate for AU management.
In fact, after several studies, the General Accounting Office "concluded that the
OPM [was] the only office clearly responsible for AU management."'" 2
Notwithstanding these clear declarations of an AL's status and of the agencies'
overt (statutory) lack of management control over ALJs, agencies have attempted
to and have partially succeeded in narrowing the APA's protections for independent
and impartial administrative decision makers. Indeed, SSA has engaged in this
endeavor more than any other agency.
While both 5 U.S.C. § 4301 and its implementing regulation, 5 C.F.R. §
930.211, forbid performance evaluations, SSA has not willingly accepted the right
to review individual AU decisions as the sole means of addressing ALJs who fail

Section § [sic] 3105 says only that "each agency shall appoint" as many AUs as are
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with § 556 and § 557.
The implication would seem to be that, whereas the CSC has responsibilities independent
of the agency's under § 5362 and § 7521, its duties under § 3105 are ministerial and
dependent upon the agency's determination of the number of AUs it needs. This view of
§ 3105 is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Ramspeck as well as with
authoritative scholarship on the meaning of the APA.
Id. He further notes:
[S]ection I I of the APA, as adopted in 1946, specified that there shall be appointed
by and for each agency 'as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary'
for proceedings pursuant to the statute:
"who shall be assigned to cases in rotation as far as practicable and shall perform no
duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be
removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and
determined by the Civil Service Commission after opportunity for hearing and upon the
record thereof."
Victor G. Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion fior Removal of
Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 593, 598 (1984) (citing
Ch. 324, § II, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)).
139. S.Doc. No. 79-248, at 215 (1946).
140. S.Doc. No. 96-1018. at 19 (1980).
141. Id. at 69.
142. Id. at 71.
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to meet "desired norms."'" SSA has adopted "a third solution ... that assertedly
avoids the use of performance evaluations, yet accomplishes the same goals by the
alternative means of evaluating ALJs' productivity."" This third solution is based
"upon the razor-thin distinction between evaluating or rating ALJs and simply
'identifying those ALJs whose performance might warrant the initiation of adverse
action proceedings."""' SSA asserts that "neither the APA nor its implementing
regulations . .. precludes [it] from .. having an opinion on an administrative law
judge's performance."'"
In so doing, SSA blurs the distinction between independence and impartiality,
describing the former in terms of the latter, thereby functionally eliminating
independence. This blurring clearly narrows the protections initially contemplated
under the APA." The January 1997 memorandum of the General Counsel is
exemplary in its conclusion: "[T]he Agency may establish reasonable administrative practices and programmatic policies that ALJs must follow, as long
as the Agency does not take actions which abridge, directly or indirectly, the duty
of impartiality an AL owes the claimant when hearing and deciding claims.'"
This conclusion does not address the concept of ALJ independence. The agency
revealed its thinking more clearly in an earlier memorandum, from the Division
of Policy and Procedure, where it stated that "[in spite of the AL's complete
-independence of decision, he/she is a part of and is under the administrative
direction and control of his employing agency.""' Agency interpretation of
independence thus narrowly circumscribes the concept of decision making.
A cogent expression of APA-mandated independence is found in Butz v.
Economou." "In Butz. .. ,the Court granted ALJs absolute immunity from tort
suits based on their judicial acts.' The Court reasoned that an ALJ performs a
'functionally comparable' role to a judge and that 'the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises
his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the

143. O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 595.
144. Id. at 596.
145. Id. (quoting COMPThOLLER GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRocEss: BETrER MANAGEMENT
is NEEDED 26 (1978)).
146. Id.

147. Close reading of the foregoing indicates that the Social Security Administration pays little heed
to the fundamental premise that it should avoid the "subtle influences" in the adjudicatory process. In
Ramspech v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128. 142 (1953), the Supreme Court noted

that the Civil Service Commission had the duty to "prevent any devious practice by an agency" that
would jeopardize an AU's independence.
148. Chater, supra note 15, at IS.
149. Memorandum from the Division of Policy and Procedure to Director, BHA (Dec. 12, 1977)
(emphasis added) (on file with author). The memo also noted: "Section 1-12 (of the BHA Handbook]
states that the AU has independence in reaching and making decisions. However, the performance of
functions is exercised within administrative restrictions imposed by the employing agency." Id.
150. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
151. Id.
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parties or other officials within the agency.'"" A number of lower court
decisions have echoed the Butz ruling, reaffirming the Court's declaration that "the
risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly
outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of these
men and women."'"
A. Statutory and Regulatory Limitations on Agency Action

The APA provides several statutory protections for ALJs. These protections
include: (I) each agency "may appoint only those individuals which the Civil
Service Commission [now OPM] [certifies] as qualified"; (2) "ALJs are exempt
from performance evaluations by their agencies [5 U.S.C. § 4301]"; (3) the
commission, not the employing agency, must show cause to remove an AUl [5
U.S.C. § 7521]; and (4) AL~s "receive periodic step increases in pay without
certification by their employing agency that they are performing at an acceptable
level of competence [5 U.S.C. 5335].""s Furthermore, agencies must rotate ALJ
caseloads, must not assign non-AL duties to an AL, and an AL must keep the
facts of each case he hears confidential.'15
The constellation of statutes that comprise the APA ensures a "process of agency
adjudication ... structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his

independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the
parties or other officials within the agency.'"" These same "provisions confer a
qualified right of decisional independence upon AUs."'" "[T]his special status
is a creation of statute, rather than the Constitution,""' but "as their role has
expanded, the AU's functional comparability to judges has gained recognition.""'
A brief overview of the critical statutes that create the ALl, together with their
implementing regulations, is important. At the heart of the statutory scheme is the
interposition of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as the singular agency
responsible for AL management. The classification of "administrative law judge"
is reserved by OPM for the specific class of appointments made under 5 U.S.C.
§ 3105 and applies to all agencies."' Furthermore, ALJs can only be appointed
after certification by OPM."'

152. O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 601 (alteration in original) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at .513).
153. Bu. 438 U.S. at 514.
154. S. REP.No. 95-697, at 2 (1978). These protections make the position of the AU "very similar
to that provided for Federal judges under the Constitution." Id
155. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also
5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 557(d)(1) (1982).
156. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513.
157. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Section 930.203b reads: "The title 'administrative law judge' is the official class title for an
administrative law judge position. Each agency will use only this official class title for personnel, budget,
and fiscal purposes." 5 C.F.R. § 930.203b (2001).
161. 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a provides, in part: "An agency may make an appointment to an
administrative law judge position only with the prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its
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Additionally, an agency may not reassign,'" transfer,'" reinstate,'"

res-

tore,'" detail," or remove an AU without OPM action.'" The OPM also
regulates levels of pay, which may determine an ALJ's initial pay, commensurate
with his qualifications.'" The OPM also oversees the rotation of ALJs, requiring,
in accord with the APA, that agencies "assign .

.

. administrative law judges in

rotation to cases.'"" Most importantly, only the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) may discipline an AL.' Title 5 U.S.C. § 7521 of the United States
Code provides that an agency may take action against an AL "only for good cause
established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record
after opportunity for hearing before the Board."''
Additionally, the OPM may remove, suspend, reduce in grade and pay, and
furlough an ALJ for thirty days or less." With limited pay exceptions, " the
role of the employing agency is subject to OPM. In the case of proposed discipline,
the agency takes on a potentially adversarial role to the AL, acting as prosecutor
before the MSPB. Apart from OPM/MSPB sanction, the agency has no ability to
unilaterally effect either positive or negative personnel action.
Specifically, the agency may neither reward its ALJs nor evaluate them as it may
other nonjudicial employees.' 7 The implementing regulations provide that "[a]n
agency may not grant a monetary and honorary award ... for superior accomplishment by an administrative law judge in the performance of adjudicatory
functions."'" Similarly, an agency may not engage in performance evaluations."
The regulations command simply that "[an agency shall not rate the performance
of an administrative law judge."'"

appointment from acertificate of eligibles furnished by OPM." Id. § 930.203a see also 5 U.S.C. § 5372
(2000) (providing for pay for administrative law judges, also subject to OPM approval).
162. 5 C.F.R. § 930.205 (2001).
163. Id. § 930.206(a).
164. Id. § 930.207.
165. Id. § 930.208.
166. Id. § 930.209(b); see also id. § 930.213 (providing for use of administrative law judges "on
detail from other agencies").
167. Id. § 930.215.
168. Id. §§ 930.210, 930.210(g).
169. Id. § 930.212.
170. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 7521(b). The implementing regulation is 5 C.F.R. § 930.214 and mirrors § 7521,
providing further for the status of the administrative law judge during removal proceedings. 5 C..R. §
930.214 (2001).
173. See, for example, 5 C.F.R. § 930.210(g)(1) (2001), which provides for the ability of the agency
to pay a new appointee at higher than the minimum pay, where the appointee has prior federal service.
Pay is to be made at "the rate that is next above the applicant's highest previous Federal rate of pay, up
to the maximum rate F." Id.
174. See id. § 930.210(b).
175. Id.
176. See id. § 930.211.
177. Id.
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Read together, sections 930.210 and 930.211 are entirely consistent. On the one
hand, these sections ensure that the AU is free from the positive influence of
agency rewards; on the other, they ensure that the agency does not engage in rating
its judges - good or bad. In the first instance, the judge is shielded from the
influence of the agency in recognition that the agency is like any other party - it
may not act to influence the outcome of the judge's decision, especially through a
system of monetary awards."" Indeed, a judge who receives "a monetary and
honorary award" from the very agency upon whose decisions he sits in judgment
cannot be unbiased. Similarly, giving the agency the ability to rate judicial
performance gives rise to an equally prohibited consequence." As one writer has
observed: "Independence of ALs from improper agency influence is critical to the
administrative structure created by the APA. Freedom of ALJs from performance
evaluations by their employing agencies is an integral aspect of that independence.""
In sum, the statutory scheme that comprises the APA, together with its implementing regulations, plainly vest management over AUs with the OPM, not with the
individual agencies. As noted earlier, an agency cannot affect an AL's status absent
OPM/MSPB action. Sections 930.210 and 930.211 place the AU in a neutral zone,
free from agency influence, either in the form of monetary rewards or performancebased punishment. In fact, this insulation is so important to the original design of
the adjudicatory structure that absent action from an independent agency, i.e., the
Office of Personnel Management and/or the Merit Systems Protection Board, an
agency may not affect an AU's status under the APA.
B. Productivity
A series of legal actions, beginning in 1977, define the parameters of an ALI's
independence. In 1977, five AUs sued SSA and various SSA officials, alleging (1)
interference with the "independence and judicial duties of ALJs mandated by the
Administrative Procedure Act"; (2) the establishment of "procedures and practices
which have the effect of rating the performance of individual A.Js"; and (3) the
establishment of "procedures by which AUs are required to meet arbitrary
quantitative quotas of completed decisions."'. The ALs sought a permanent
injunction against SSA." 2 Prior to a final verdict, the parties settled the action in

178. SSA's own regulations require that an "administrative law judge shall not conduct a hearing
if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or has any interest in the matter pending
for decision." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940.416.1440 (2000); see aLso Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d
Cir. 1995) ("Essential to a fair hearing is the right to an unbiased judge .... The due process
requirement of an impartial decisionmaker is applied more strictly in administrative proceedings than in
court proceedings because of the absence of procedural safeguards normally available in judicial
proceedings.").
179. The question, addressed in the succeeding section, is the nature of the action which an agency
may take as a result of any "performance" data.
180. O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 626.
181. Complaint for Declaratory Judgement and Injunctive Relief at 7, Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
182. Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (filed Nov. 16, 1977).
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what is now known as the "Bono Settlement. 39 The settlement provides that
"OHA will not issue directives or memoranda setting any specific number of
dispositions by ALJs as quota or goals."'"
In 1980, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nash v. Califano,xs found that
the plaintiff, an ALT assigned to SSA, had standing to litigate the issue of whether
the agency acted in violation of the APA by establishing performance
evaluations. " Initially, the court found that the alleged violations reached
"virtually every aspect of [Judge Nash's] daily role.""'7 The court found that
because Judge Nash allegedly received "mandatory, unlawful instructions regarding
every detail of [his] judicial role," Judge Nash met the necessary "personal stake
and interest" Article M standing requirements.'" The court further found that the
injuries allegedly suffered by Judge Nash directly impacted his rights under 5
U.S.C. § 4301 and the "position description promulgated by the Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals."'"m While the court later found "no direct pressure on ALJs to
maintain a fixed percentage of reversals,'"" it affirmed the fundamental tenants
of the APA, finding that "AL~s themselves have both a statutory right to decisional
independence and legal standing to safeguard that independence."''
In a December 12, 1977, memorandum directed to the Bono litigation, the
Division of Policy and Procedure wrote that "[iut is our belief that the Bureau could
take further action in a number of areas without seriously impinging on ALJ
independence.""'' The memo argued that any decision regarding the scope of ALJ
independence must consider that this independence is "provided as a protection for
the individuals subject to his jurisdiction, not for the benefit of the judge himself."'9 SSA General Counsel repeated this same view twenty years later when
he asserted that "an ALU's independence is 'limited to the protections of . . .
compensation and tenure found in the [APA],' and that any 'larger right of
decisional independence' would not rest with the ALJs, but with 'the claimants
whose rights are adjudicated by the ALJs."""

183. Executed in its entirety on June 19, 1979. See id.
184. Bon), Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 at 1.
185. 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id.
188. Id
189. Id. at 17.
190. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989). The court found "[alithough the defendants
may have engaged in some questionable practices which clearly caused great unrest among AUs, ...
they did not infringe on the decisional independence of AUs." Id. The court apparently accepted the
agency's position that "reversal rates were used as a benchmark in deciding whether there might be
problems in the adjudicatory methods of particularly high (or low) reversal rate AUs." Id. at 681.
191. O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 617 (emphasis added).
192. Memorandum from the Division of Policy and Procedure to Director, BHA (Dec. 12, 1977)
(on file with author).
193. Id.
194. Chater, supra note 15, at 10 (quoting Goodman v. Svahn, 614 F. Supp. 726, 728 (D.D.C.
1985)).
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While the agency read the APA to provide narrow protections for an ALl's
independence, Nash I put the issue to rest. "' One writer aptly noted that
"[a]lthough the purpose of the ALJs' independence is to protect the public, this
independence is created by establishing procedural safeguards protecting AIJs from
agency interference."'" However, the procedural safeguards of compensation,
tenure, and freedom from performance evaluations are statutorily created "rights
personal to the judges,'"" and "[tihe fact that Congress gave these rights to ALJs
for the benefit of the public does not make them any less the ALJs' rights."'
In 1984, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia considered the effect
of the Bellmon Amendments on the Social Security Act in Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Heckler.'" The Bellmon Amendments initiated the

Bellmon Review Program.' This program implemented "Section 304(g) of the
Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980."' " At issue was the "targeting
of individual ALJs .

.

. based upon allowance rates."'

The Association of Ad-

ministrative Law Judges took the position that "the Bellmon Review Program would
result in illegal performance ratings of ALJs and would have the effect of chilling
ALJ decision independence."'
Then-Deputy Associate Commissioner Hays
"sought advice from the Office of General Counsel."' The Office of General
Counsel advised Hays that while the Senate version of the Bellmon Amendments
did require such targeting, "the Conference Report did not."' The General
Counsel went on to note that such targeting could possibly chill decisional
independence; however, the office concluded that "while the law did not directly
preclude targeting, there could be some legal risk, and suggested the desirability of
reviewing some denial as well as favorable decisions."'
Notwithstanding the advice of counsel, the associate commissioner testified that
he "interpreted the Bellman Amendment

. .

. to require the focus on allowance

decisions only." ' In so acting, OHA framed "the term 'goals' to describe SSA
projections of allowance rates.""' Thus, the issue was joined, as ALJs were
targeted for not achieving identified goals. Indeed, certain ALJ's were provided
"training... on the application of the Social Security disability regulations and the
sequential evaluation process of adjudicating cases."'

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1980).
O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 617.
id.
Id.
594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
Id at 1133.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
IdU
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1137-38.
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The Heckler court found that the agency's "preoccupation with allowance rates"
caused the ALJs to "reasonably feel pressure to issue fewer allowance decisions in
the name of accuracy." ' The court reasoned that, especially in close cases, this
pressure could affect a case's outcome.2" While the court ultimately concluded
that there was no longer a need for injunctive relief because the agency had "shifted
their focus, obviating the need for... restructuring of the agency at this time," it
clearly viewed the agency's actions with disfavor."'2 In fact, the Heckler court
stated that the agency's focus on allowance rates "created an untenable atmosphere
of tension and unfairness which violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific
provision thereof.2" 3 The Heckler case thereby becomes one of the lines of

demarcation in the quest for understanding the reach of the APA, prohibiting both
agency action which targets individual ALJs and allowance rates.
Notwithstanding this decision, the agency asserted in a memorandum of May 4,
1992, that the case principally held that "an agency may gather data and form an
opinion of an ALJ's performance. Accordingly, the mere calculation and maintenance of own motion and grant-review data does not violate [the APA]."214
However, the Heckler court actually stated that "the mere calculation and
maintenance of own motion and grant-review data does not violate 5 U.S.C. §
4301.""' The Heckler court did not focus on the maintenance of data, but rather
on the later use of that data to effectuate a decisional change on the part of the
otherwise neutral and impartial ALU - i.e., a performance evaluation, which is
prohibited by 5 U.S.'C. § 43010" The holding of Heckler is consistent with the
later holding in Nash f.17 The Nash II court reasoned that an agency could
review dead cases "so long as such efforts did not directly interfere with 'live'
decisions (unless in accordance with the usual administrative review performed by
the Appeals Council). 2 1'

210. Id. at 1142.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1143. The court noted that the "[diefendants' insensitivity to that degree of decisional
independence the APA affords to administrative law judges and the injudicious use of phrases such as
'targeting,' 'goals.' and 'behavior modification' could have tended to corrupt the ability of administrative
law judges to exercise that independence in the vital cases they decide." Id
213. Id (emphasis added).
214. Memorandum from Donald A. Gonya, Chief Counsel, to Louis D. Enoff, Principal Deputy
Commissioner (May 4. 1992) (on file with author).
215. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1140.

216. Interestingly, the court noted, without comment, that the then-Deputy Associate Commissioner
Hays was a member of the Senior Executive Service, a group of "supergrade" federal employees who
are performance rated; observing that Mr. Hays was alleged to have "a financial incentive to pressure
AUs to reduce their allowance rates .... [als. . . he had a performance plan which stated as one of its
goals or objectives, the reduction of allowance rates." Id.at 1136. The court further noted that "Mr. Hays
denied that the reduction of allowance rates was an independent goal in the performance plan." Id. at
1136-37. The point, however, is well made. What problems arise when performance-rated employees.
whose salaries and bonuses (all part of SES service) are tied to the activity of otherwise nonperformance-rated appointees charged with independent and impartial decision making?
217. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
218. Id. at 680.
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The issue of agency oversight reached a pinnacle in 1984 when SSA filed a series
of actions before the Merit Systems Protection Board seeking to remove three ALJs
2 ' In these three cases,
based on their lack of "production.""
SSA argued to the
MSPB that the ALJs in question had performed at a much lower production rate
than their peers.' In the lead case, SSA submitted evidence "that the judge's
disposition rate for the years 1980-81 was fifteen to sixteen cases per month,
compared to an average of thirty to thirty-two for all SSA AUs. In addition, his
average monthly 'pending' caseload for 1981 was sixty-four, compared with 178 for
all SSA AL~s.""' The MSPB administrative law judge rejected the Al's legal
position and recommended dismissal."
On appeal, the full MSPB ruled that "the SSA's evidence that the AU's case
dispositions were half the national average was not enough to show unacceptably
low productivity '[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrating the validity of using
its statistics to measure comparative productivity." ' The board reasoned that
"SSA cases were not fungible and that SSA's comparable statistics did not take into
sufficient account the differences among the different types of cases. '
While these three cases did show that SSA could "bring charges against low
producing AUs," the agency had a "virtually insurmountable burden of proof' to
show a lack of productivity.' This burden of proof required' that SSA must
carefully analyze "the particularcases heard by the cited ALU."2
In testimony before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in 1980, Reuben Lotner, an ALU with the
Federal Communications Commission, reaffirmed the later MSPB finding." He
testified that statistical studies have little or no value in analyzing judges' productivity.2" He reasoned that unless a study accounts for factors such as the nature
of the case, the number and complexity of the issues involved, the length of
prehearing proceedings, evidentiary and posthearing proceedings, and the problems
encountered in writing the decision, the study arguably has little meaning as a real
measure of a judge's workload. '

219. Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Balaban, 20 M.S.P.R. 675 (1984); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Brennan, 19
M.S.P.R. 335 (1984); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984).
220. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Evtablishing an Appropriate
System of Perftrmance Evaluation for AL/s,7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589, 599 (1993).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 331).

224. Id. The board later applied the same reasoning to two other cases against SSA AUs with
similar productivity records. Id.
225. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
226. ld (emphasis added).
227. Administrative Law Judge System: Hearings Before the Subcomn For Consumers of the
Comnt On Commerce, Science, and Transp., 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 67 (1980) (statement of Judge
Reuben Lozner, AU. FCC), cited in O'Keeffe, supra note 12, at 592 n.7.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 67-68.
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The heart of the MSPB decision is evident - numbers alone will not meet the
"good cause" standard under 5 U.S.C. § 7521. 0 In one writer's view, "[tihe 'good
cause' standard for disciplining 'bad apple' ALJs is seen correctly as a protection of
the ALJs' decisional independence."" He further states that "[a]gencies should
view the initiation of disciplinary proceedings... as a last resort." 23
. However, Social Security Administration v. Goodman established that the "good
cause" standard used in 5 U.S.C. § 7521 is not equivalent to the "good behavior"
standard enjoyed by Article III federal judges."' Upon analysis of the statutory
scheme, the MSPB concluded "that there is no generic prohibition to filing of this
charge," but it did not otherwise define good cause except to say that it was not be
found here.'
In Social Security Administration v. Glover," the MSPB commented on
removal proceedings based upon what occurs in the hearing room. The board held
that what occurs in the hearing room "should be reserved for those cases which
involve serious improprieties, flagrant abuses, or repeated breaches of acceptable
standards of judicial behavior."' While not directly touching upon the question
of removal solely for productivity, the tenor. of the standard makes plain that
numbers alone, absent careful and complete analysis, will not suffice for removal.
Finally, in Brennan v. Department of Health and Human Services, ' the Federal
Circuit noted that "Idjetermining the existence of 'good cause' is not a simple
task. " ' It concluded that agency action which interferes with "the quasi-judicial
functions" of an AUI cannot constitute "good cause" but is a "question of fact and
must be answered on a case by case basis."' In effect, the ALT may decline to
follow agency procedures which constitute an "improper interference with the A.J's

230. One commentator also cogently observes:
Even if performance standards do not lead to changes in the substance of an AU's
decision, clearly their effect is to change the time frame in which it is reached. The
simplest example of this effect is wrought by a production quota. The purpose of the
quota is to encourage underproducers to catch up with the average. Then the average goes
up. However, if the quota is based on the average, the quota goes up. Standards simply
edge higher and higher. For example, the Social Security Administration has set
constantly rising production goals: twelve decisions per month in the 1960s; fifteen to
twenty in the early 1970s. twenty-six in 1975, thirty to thirty-two in 1980-1981, andforty
cases per month in 1983. Thus, a case before the Social Security Administrationcurrently
receives one-third of the time that it would have received twenty years ago.
O'Keeffe, supra note 12. at 618 (emphasis added).
23 1. Lubbers, supra note 220, at 600.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. See Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 323 (1984).
234. Id. at 327. Interestingly, in footnote 10 of Goodman, the MPSB stated: "As we hold today in
Social Security Administration v. Manion... instructions which do not improperly interfere with the
performance of an AU's judicial functions can be issued by the employing agency." Id. at 327 n. 10.
235. 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984).
236. Id. at 78.
237. 787 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
238. Id. at 1563.
239. Id.
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performance of his quasi-judicial functions," but he runs the risk of a later
°
determination that the practices were not an improper interference.u
In summary, it is plain that an agency may not promulgate procedures or
practices which improperly interfere with the AI's judicial function. The Bellmon
Review is clearly such a practice, with the review of individual ALJs' decisions
creating "an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which violated the
spirit of the APA. " ' On the other hand, the agency succeeded, in theory, in
establishing productivity as a basis for "good cause" removal before the MSPB.
However, the MSPB established a clear - and high - threshold that numbers
alone will not meet this "good cause" standard.
In Heckler, the court plainly established a standard of review which required that
the whole of the complained-of practice or procedure be examined. 2 It thereby
further established that agency practices whose effect is indirect, such that there is
a "reasonable" basis to infer improper interference, may also be actionable.
Applying the MSPB standard, it is plain that such determinations must be made on
a case-by-case basis.
In resolution of the Bono litigation, the agency agreed to forego goals and quotas,
though not for purposes of raising the question before the MSPB. So, while it may
not institute goals or quotas per the force of that settlement, nothing precludes the
agency from raising the productivity issue before the board, though under the
constraints earlier established under Goodman. It is also plain that the Bono
agreement remains in full force and effect, consistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and is enforceable in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri. 3
VI. Are Administrative Law Judges Required as Presiding Officials by the Administrative Procedure Act in the Conduct of Hearings Before Social Security's
Office of Hearings and Appeals?
Administrative law judges are creatures of statute, not the Constitution.

'

Thus,

240. Id.
241. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984).
242. Id. The court in Heckler stated that "[t]he evidence as a whole, persuasively demonstrated that
defendants retained an unjustifiable preoccupation with allowance rates, to the extent that AL~s could
reasonably feel pressure to issue fewer allowance decisions ....
" Id. at 1142.
243. Goodman v. Svahn, 614 F. Supp. 726, 731 (D.D.C. 1985). The court held:
On June 19, 1979 the parties in Bono executed a settlement agreement which provided
that OHA would not set specific disposition quotas for AUs. Plaintiff asserts that he may
seek to enforce the settlement agreement in this Court under Rule 71 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ....
[However,]. ...to the extent plaintiff seeks to assert he is a beneficiary of the Bono
settlement within the meaning of F.R.Civ.P. 71 he must.., seek enforcement in the Bono
action itself.
Id.
244. One noted commentator writes:
The term "federal administrative judiciary" is not frequently used, but it highlights the
relationship between the administrative decision system and the federal judiciary. Ad-
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it is by congressional mandate that such judges preside in any hearing.•"

Whether

ALJs must preside over SSA hearings has been the subject of great debate. As one
preeminent writer observed:
Another way in which Social Security claims have been set apart
from the other administrative agencies has been the question of the applicability of the APA to Title II disability claims. In other words, there
has been some contention that the protections afforded through the
APA - such as a politically independent decisionmaker - are not

relevant to Social Security hearings whereas they are critical to the
regulatory setting. However, legislative history and judicial case law
clearly demonstrate that the APA is applicable to the Social Security
Act."
A. The Social Security Act and the Administrative ProcedureAct

The Social Security Act antedates the APA by seven years. ' In fact, the
attorney general's committee that drafted the APA used the Social Security Act
procedures as a model, and the "Committee considered the APA to be 'largely
declaratory' of the provisions of the Social Security Act."' Section 554(a) of the
APA provides that the act is applicable "in every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."z'
Nevertheless, several commentators have argued that because the Social Security
Act does not contain the words "on the record," the APA does not apply to SSA
ministrative deciders ae significant participants in our constitutional scheme....
Administrative Law Judges as a group are among the most diversely talented, welltrained, and deeply entrenched adjudicators in our system, even when they are compared
with the federal district and state judiciary. There are almost 1,200 AUs who are assigned
to 30 federal agencies. This is approximately equivalent to the number of judges on the
federal trial bench....
•.. A survey concludes ...

in education, training and experience, they seem no less

qualified than bankruptcy judges and magistrates, if not members of the federal bench....
They enjoy a more secure tenure and compensation than do bankruptcy judges or
magistrates because they do not serve terms. Rather, they effectively receive life tenure
subject to removal for good cause. . These protections provide AUs with a certain
degree of judicial independence.
Verkuil, supra note 116, at 1343-45.
245. In the words of one writer, addressing the Ways and Means Committee: "Ultimate resolution
of the issue is properly a function of Congress; for the utilization of AUs involves, at heart, basic
questions of national policy on the administration of justice to the ordinary citizen." RECENT STUDIES,
supra note 105, at 240; see also Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 133 (1953)
("The position of hearing examiners is not a constitutionally protected position. It is a creature of
congressional enactment.").
246. DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE, A
STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING PROCESS 67 (1985) (emphasis added).

247. I
248. Id.
249. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
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hearings.' These commentators note that Congress has explicitly amended other
laws "to require that [its] hearings conform with the APA requirements that AUs
be the presiding officers.' 2 ' They also note that Congress has never amended the
SSI provisions to include the APA requirement of AUs as presiding officers."
These commentators point to the conspicuous absence of any mention of the APA
or ALT as presiding officers in the SSI amendments as clear evidence that
"Congress did not place these hearings under the APA."' 3
These conclusions, say those opposed to APA applicability, were echoed by the
1972 SSI legislation."' These commentators argue that the language of the later
1977 SSI amendments specifically authorized non-APA hearing officers, stating that
the Secretary may appoint hearing examiners "'to the extent the Secretary finds
it will promote the objectives of this title,' the appointment as hearing examiners'of
'qualified persons' to conduct the required hearings without meeting the specific
standardprescribedfor hearing examiners by or under Subchapter II of Chapter
5 of Title 5, United States Code."'
However, these arguments against applying the APA to SSI hearings do not paint
a complete picture of the relationship between the APA and the Social Security Act.
Indeed, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments together with subsequent
legislation in 1977 make clear that AIJs must preside over Social Security Act
hearings. Even if one were to ignore the subsequent legislation and focus only on
the 1972 SSI amendments, an argument can still be made that the APA applies. The
SSI amendments require that SSA must maintain a "record" of the hearings." 7
This requirement arguably meets the APA "hearing on the record" requirement.
Furthermore, while the SSI amendments do make the secretary's fact-finding
conclusions binding, all "other determinations of the Secretary shall be subject to
judicial review [in a U.S. district court] pursuant to § 405(g) of the Social Security
statute." 258 Furthermore, section 405(g) "requires that '[a]s part of his answer, the
Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the

250. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 206.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
255. See supra note 70 for a more complete statement of the facts surrounding the Civil Service
Commission's 1973 ruling that SSI cases did not require APA-appointed hearing officers, the subsequent
appointment of temporary non-APA administrative law judges, and Congress' action definitively
overruling the Civil Service Commission's holding in 1977. Interim Legislation, Public Law 94-202
established non-APA decision-makers, effective January 2, 1976. Subsequently, Congress rectified the
issue, providing for APA-appointed "hearing examiners," passing Public Law 95-216 on December 20,
1977.
256. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 206 (emphasis added). Subchapter II of chapter 5 of title
5, United States Code are the APA's provisions for the conduct of hearings, powers of hearing officers
and procedural rights of the parties.
257. Id. at 217.
258. Id.
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evidence upon Which the findings and decision complained of are based."'"9 The
section 405(g) requirement "that the Secretary furnish a transcript of the record can
only mean that a record must be maintained in order to facilitate judicial review of
the propriety of application of the facts to the law.""'' The requirement that the
secretary furnish a transcript of the hearing "triggers the need to appoint ALJs
pursuant to § 3105 of the APA."'
Several commentators, however, have disputed this analysis. In response to an
argument in 1973 before the Civil Service Commission over whether the 1972 SSI
amendments required the appointment of ALJs as presiding officers, the General
Counsel of the Civil Service Commission argued a literal interpretation of the
statute.' He asserted that the absence of an "explicit requirement that the determination be made 'on the record' as required by section 554 (a) of the APA" meant
that APA coverage did not extend to SSI hearings.
In answer, the "HEW General Counsel argue[d] that the cross reference in section
1631(d)(1) to 205(g) meets the 'on the record' requirement because, on judicial
review, 'the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are
based."' ' The Ways and Means Committee staff, writing in 1974 in support of
the adoption of clarifying amendments, supported the latter (HEW) view.' The
staff did not argue that the amendments would change the SSI's approach, but rather
would "strengthen the argument that the determination is on the record."'
The First Circuit, in Caswell v. Califano,' held that the APA applied to SSA.
In support, the Caswell court noted that several other circuits had reached the same
result.'

259. Id.

260. Id.
261. Id.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

DISABIUTY INSURANCE PROGRAM, supra note 66. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Others have echoed this same analysis, arguing that the APA provides

that its contents will be applicable "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C § 5541a] (2000). "Since every decision
in the Social Security Act is rendered on the evidence of record as developed at the hearing stage, the
APA must apply to Title i hearings." COFER, supra note 246, at 67.

267. 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
268. Id. Of interest is the date of the case. In 1978, the Social Security Administration had departed
from the course laid down by its former Director of the BHA, H. Dale Cook (who was appointed to the
federal bench in 1974), and instead, plotted a course charted, in part, by its new Director, Robert
Trachtenberg (who assumed office in 1975). During Director Cook's tenure, the agency voiced strong
arguments in favor of APA applicability before the Civil Service Commission, arguing the need for Administrative Law Judges specifically. Under Director Trachtenberg, new "initiatives" were put into place,
spiraling the agency into a twenty-five year tension with its judges, and leading to arguments made
(presumably) by SSA's Office of General Counsel and/or one or more individual United States
Attorney(s) (as opposed to the Department of Justice) that the APA did not apply (hence, the Court's
finding at note 13 of its opinion). In the wake of Director Trachtenberg's tenure lies a long history of
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Unlike the Caswell court, the United States Supreme Court, in Richardson v.
Perales,' declined to address the issue of APA applicability, finding that the issue
was not necessary to the decision of the Court."7 Instead, it held that "the social
security
, , 27 administrative procedure does not vary from that prescribed by the
APA.

1

This holding becomes significant in light of the argument advanced by the

Government in that case. The Government did not argue the inapplicability of the
APA; instead, it assumed that the APA was applicable. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the government, stated that "the broad question of the general applicability" of the APA to such hearings "'is of no consequence here. For, assuming
its applicability, the Administrative Procedure Act specifically authorizes the
procedures which the Secretary follows under the Social Security Act."' ' This
argument by the Solicitor General, coupled with the Supreme Court's finding that
"[w]e need not decide whether the APA has general application to Social Security
' shows that the Perales Court did not alter "the scope of the
disability claims,"274
APA's coverage. '
This position is consistent with the position maintained by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) since the passage of the APA. '6 In 1947, the Attorney General's
Manual of the Administrative Procedure Act listed title II of the Social Security Act
as a statute that incorporated "the [adjudicative] provisions of the APA [5 U.S.C.
554]."'"
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Civil Service Commission, in 1973, found
that the 1972 SSI amendments did not require APA judges for SSI hearings."'
conflict, leading the staff of the House Ways and Means Committee to comment:
mhe staff is concerned by the apparent state of BHA administration at the present
time. Lawsuits have been filed by BHA employees concerning administration and a
multitude of administrative charges have been instituted by both sides. It is an agency at
war with itself. The management and rather substantial numbers of staff are devoting a
great deal of their time attacking each other. This time could be better spent serving

socialsecurity claimants.
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3 (emphasis added).

Finally, it should be noted, that in later cases, the Social Security Administration has affirmatively
argued the applicability of the APA. In J.L v. Social Security Administration, 971 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1992), the Social Security Administration, in opposition to application to the Rehabilitation Act in a case
of alleged discrimination, "insists that they [plaintiffs) must seek an administrative remedy under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 700 et seq. ("APA*)." Id. at 263.
269. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
270. Id. at 409.
271. Id.
272. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 218.
273. Justice Department Reply Brief in Richardson v. Perales,402 U.S. 389 (1971).
274. Perales,402 U.S. at 409.
275. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 218. Professor Rosenblum further comments: "Solicitor
General Griswold went on to say that the compatibility of procedures between the Social Security Act
and the APA is 'not surprising.' since the Social Security Act furnished the model upon which the
Administrative Procedure Act was based." Id. at 218 n.242.
276. COrER, supra note 246, at 68.
277. Id. (citations omitted).
278. On December 14, 1973, following a hearing on December 3, 1973. Chairman Hampton, of the
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The commission reached this conclusion despite HEW's objection.' As a result,
Congress passed emergency legislation authorizing the hiring of so-called
"temporary administrative law judges," who Were hired, not under the APA, but as
a stopgap measure to address burgeoning case filings in the wake of the Civil
Service Commission's negative ruling.' Congress feared that if it did not act,
legal action might be taken that would invalidate hundreds, if not thousands, of Title
XVI cases if decided by lesser "examiners" who were not APA judges."
Congress attempted an interim solution by hiring "temporary administrative law
judges," appointed for a limited term, "with such appointments terminating no later
than at the close of the period ending December 31, 19 7 8 ."m In the meantime,
the agency, working with the Staff of the Ways and Means Committee, was
devising clarifying legislation specifically designed to overturn the Civil Service
Commission's adverse determination.'" The critical focus of the legislation was
whether, because of the APA's "on the record" requirement, ALJs, and not some
other, lesser decision maker must preside.
Congress resolved the issue in 1977. In late 1977, on the eve of the Christmas
holiday, Congress affirmatively voiced its will that the "temporary administrative
law judges," forced upon the Social Security Administration by the Civil Service

Civil Service Commission, made known his final decision on the question whether Congress intended
that the newly enacted SSI program would have hearings in which APA administrative law judges
presided. See DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, supra note 66, at 55. He concluded "that administrative
law judges are not required to preside over SSI hearings because the program is not under the APA."
Id.
HEW's argument, urging "the Commissioners to endorse HEW's determination to accord a lowly
private citizen - a welfare recipient - the same rights as the Government accords a powerful
corporation in contested matters: namely, the right to appear before an Administrative Law Judge under
the full rights and protection of the Administrative Procedure Act" went unheeded. Id. at 63.
279. Id.
280. See id at 60-64.
281. By letter of October 5, 1973, Assistant Attorney General Robert Dixon responded to the Civil
Service Commission on the issue of APA applicability to the new SSI program. Id. at 61. He voiced the
following concern: "[Ilf a decision is made to appoint non-APA hearing examiners, subject to the control
of HEW, and that decision proves wrong, there may be thousands of denials requiring rehearing." Id.
By letter of October 12, 1973, HEW Secretary Weinberger appealed to Chairman Hampton [of the
Civil Service Commission] for resolution of what he termed "a crisis ... in HEW's preparations to
implement the new Supplemental Security Income program." Id. (alteration in original).
282. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1509, 1559. The
later 1977 act references the earlier statute by which the temporary administrative law judges were
originally appointed:
Sec. 3. The persons appointed under section 163 1(d)(2) of the Social Security Act (as
in effect prior to the enactment of this Act) to serve as hearing examiners in hearings
under section 1631(c) of such Act may conduct hearings under titles I!, XVI, and XVIII
of the Social Security Act if the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare finds it will
promote the achievement of the objectives of such titles. ntwithstanding the fact that
their appointments were made without meeting the requirements for hearing examiners
appointed under section 3105 of title 5. United States Code ....
Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-202, § 3, 89 Stat. 1135 (1976) (emphasis added).
283. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 7.
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Commission's December 1973 ruling, were now officially APA-mandated
judges.' This legislation provided:
The persons who were appointed to serve as hearing examiners ...
shall be deemed appointed to career-absolute positions as hearing
examiners under and in accordance with section 3105 of title 5, United
States Code, with the same authority and tenure (without regard to the
expiration of such period) as hearing examiners appointed directly under
section 3105, and shall receive compensation at the same rate as hearing
examiners appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
[now Health and Human Services] directly under section 3105. All of
the provisions of title 5, United States Code, and the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, which are applicable to hearing examiners
appointed under such section 3105, shall apply to the persons described

in the preceding sentence.'
Thus, Congress specifically legislated that ALJs (then "hearing examiners")
appointed under § 3105 of the APA were to decide title II, title XVI and title XVIII
cases.' The passage of Public Law 95-216 also changed these non-APA, temporary judges into APA-appointed judges.2 7 In so providing, Congress left no
doubt as to its intention. APA administrative law judges, and not some other, lesser
hearing officers, were to hear and decide cases arising under title II, title XVI and
title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
More directly then, the question becomes: If the APA applies to proceedings
conducted under the Social Security Act, are Administrative Law Judges required
as presiding officers? The answer is simply, yes, unless otherwise excepted by
specific congressional act.
First, Congress expressly mandated that the only type of "administrative law
judges" are those appointed under title 5, § 3105 of the APA.m References to
ALJs, both within the Social Security Act and the APA, are only to "APA-appointed
Administrative Law Judges."' ' Having determined that such proceedings are "on
the record," only "administrative law judges" may preside.'
Second, title 5, § 559 of the APA specifically requires that subsequent laws may
not modify the law relating to AL~s, "except to the extent that it does so
expressly."' Thus, subsequent legislation and subsequent rule making may not
change the requirement that AiLs must preside in SSA hearings unless it does so
expressly. Furthermore, the appointment of ALJs (Q 3105), the fact that the only
type of "administrative law judge" is an APA-appointed judge (§ 5372), and the

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1509.
Id. at 1559.
Id.
Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1509.
5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000).
See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2000).
See supra note 47.
5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000) (emphasis added).
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standards by which such appointees are disciplined and/or removed (§ 7521) can
only be accomplished by direct congressional action. In short, only direct
congressional action can overturn the rule that ALJs must preside over hearings
under titles II, XVI, and XVIII of the Social Security Act.
B. Legislative History of the Social Security Act As Affecting AL Utilization

The legislative history of the Social Security Act makes plain that Congress
intended that only ALJs may serve as presiding officers in Social Security hearings.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the enactment of the 1972 SSI program. In
the wake of the Civil Service Commission's 1973 determination that SSI hearings
did not require APA-appointed hearing examiners,m congressional inquiry was
directed to this exact issue.
The Ways and Means Committee staff reiterated its long-held position "that the
APA applies to Social Security title II and title XVIII cases."' As the staff
pointed out in its 1974 report, "[t]he legislative history of the law establishing the
SSI program makes it clear that the committee intended that the hearings conducted
under the new program are to be under the APA .... "'
Additionally, then-Chairman Mills stated on the house floor that "[tihe hearings
to which the bill refers would be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and
all the safeguards for a fair and equitable hearing in the act would apply to the
hearing."' Representative Carey also expressly noted that the APA applied to
appeals from denials of benefits.' He stated that "[t]he gentlemen pointed out that
the Administrative Procedure Act does cover the review of benefits under this bill.
It has been erroneously contended it did not."'t
Most importantly, the House Ways and Means Committee, in January 1979,
reaffirmed the committee's stance that the 1977 legislation ended all dispute on the
question of APA applicability to social security proceedings.' The committee
noted that the 1975 legislation "explicitly put the SSI and Social Security programs
on the same basis as far as hearings and appeals are concerned. " ' The committee
further noted that the legislation was necessary "to override an interpretation of the
Civil Service Commission that the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable
to SSI hearings" and that "[t]he Committee bill will put this matter to rest by clearly
providing on-the-record administrative hearings and judicial review of a parallel
DISABILrrY INSURANCE PROGRAM, supra note 66, at 55.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57 (citing 117 CONG. REC. 5658).
Id.
Id.
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 9.
Id. Commenting on this legislation, the 1975 House report cogently stated:
The bill eliminates the distinction in the nature of hearings and hearing officers under
the Social Security and SSI programs, thus resulting in a common corps of hearing
officers authorized to conduct hearings under both programs with common procedural
safeguards provided under the Social Security Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
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nature for Social Security, SSI and Medicare claimants."' Equally significant, the
Center for Administrative Justice,"' the Administrative Conference of the United
States,' and Senate Report 94-50 all support the conclusion that ALJs must
serve as presiding officers in Social Security hearings.
There can be no question then, but that affirmative congressional action has laid
to rest any doubt about the status of the decision maker in Social Security hearings.
First, such hearings are to be held.under the ambit of both the Social Security Act
and the APA. Second, such hearings are to be presided over by APA-appointed
ALJs, who are seen as necessary to ensure fairness and impartiality for the ordinary
citizen.'
In establishing hearings for the title II, title XVI and title XVIII
programs under the aegis of APA-appointed officers (AIJs appointed under § 3105
of the APA), Congress placed its imprimatur of approval on the continued
utilization of APA-appointed ALJs as presiding officers over hearings conducted by
SSA, "thus resulting in a common corps of hearing officers authorized to conduct
hearings under both programs with common procedural safeguards under the Social
Security Act and the Administrative Procedure Act."'
VII. What Are the Ramifications of Formal Recognition of the Applicability of the
APA to Social Security Proceedings Before ALJs?
In 1979, following the filing of the Bono lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri,' the House Committee on Ways
.and Means expressed grave concern for "the apparent state of BHA administration

300. Id.
301. The Center for Administrative Justice report, issued in late 1977, supported the APA hearing
system:
It is our view that public trust in the SSA scheme of social insurance would he
undermined significantly were the opportunity for a face-to-face encounter with a
demonstrably independent decisionmaker eliminated from the system. To be sure,
independence could be structured apart from the APA. But in our view the savings would
be very modest, because one would want protections for decisional independence very
much like the ones the APA provides and would, in addition, want people with
qualifications (and therefore salaries) very much like the current AUs. Alternative
devices, such as lay or expert panels, are either more expensive or more unpredictable
than the AU decider.
Id. at 10.
302. The Administrative Conference of the United States, in a report issued in 1978, stated: "The
use of administrative law judges appointed in conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act...
should be continued." Id.
303. CoFER, supra note 246, at 68 (citing Social Security Act Legislative History, Pub. L. No 94202, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 2347) 2352).
304. "[D]ue process requires that the person who takes the evidence and makes the decision be
impartial, that the trier of fact cannot be prosecutor in the same matter, and that he cannot have been
involved in the matter previously as an agency staff person." SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36,
at 7.
305. Id. at 9.
306. Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (filed November 16,
1977).
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at the present time."'' It declared that the "agency [was] at war with itself. The
management and rather substantial numbers of staff are devoting a great deal of
their time attacking each other. This time could be better spent serving social
security claimants."'
The years have not dimmed the arguments, particularly as witnessed in the
formation and birth within the past year of a new Administrative Law Judge labor
organization, whose purpose is to approach SSA administration on a level playing
field. Again, the House Committee on Ways and Means succinctly articulated the
issues. From the judicial perspective, a "[Ihack of openness with employees and
inadequate communication of decisions is a fairly general complaint of AU's and
other professional groups."' From the agency's perspective, Robert Trachtenberg, then-Director of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, stated that new
initiatives were necessary "to reverse the dismal performance of his Bureau and
to bring each of the hearing offices, which were not at the time (1974) unlike
independent fiefdoms, under the supervision of the BHA." '
The 1975 creation of a corps of managers was seen by Director Trachtenberg
as an attempt to "modernize BHA." '' His critics declared, however, that "the
disarray at BHA was overstated." ' Nevertheless, in a vast attempt at modernization or, some would say, control, the agency inserted managers at every level,
imposing production quotas 3 on judges, physicians, staff attorneys, program
analysts, and clerical assistants who "[felt] threatened not only by proposed
downgrading, which [was] forcing them into inappropriate job activities, but also
by the job descriptions of other professionals, either in being or proposed, who
would infringe on what they consider their basic functions.""' Indeed, even "the
physicians on the BHA medical staff [were] very disturbed by what they consider
a downgrading of their operation and the insertion of a manager who supervise[d]
aspects which they believe[d] should be under professional medical control." ''
Director Trachtenberg later admitted that "'aggressive management initiatives
did generate rancor, distrust, and indeed, poor morale among the A.J's [sic]." 3 6

307. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2.
310. Id. at 3.
311. Id. at 4.
312. Id. at 3. A dramatic response was filed with the Subcommittee commenting upon Director
Trachtenberg's views. Id at 70. An agency official, Mr. James Minton, program operations officer,
Region Ill, began his letter stating that Mr. Trachtenberg "grossly exaggerates and flagrantly distorts the
truth in his self-serving sworn statement of September 5, 1978. He appears intoxicated by his own press
releases: thereby deluding himself in believing that his is the Messiah whose mission was to redeem
BHA of all its base and scandalous deeds." Id.
313. In Trachtenberg's words, these standards were "goals." not quotas. Delays in Social Security
Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcomun. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
94th Cong. 50-51 (1975).
314. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3-4.
315. Id. at 3.
316. Id.
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In the words of the Ways and Means Committee, "the Director and the new
.managers' came in relatively 'hardnose' and our ALJ survey indicates that
openness with employees, and keeping them abreast of new initiatives, was not
BHA's high suit."3 '7 This high level of tension led the Ways and Means
Committee to conclude that "the greater emphasis in all phases of the process
[had] been placed on 'moving the cases' rather than rendering fair and sound
decisions.'.. In the time since the 1975 Trachtenberg initiatives, many assert
that the climate has not significantly changed. Whether intended or not, Director
Trachtenberg left an indelible, albeit questioned, legacy.
It is against this backdrop that the question at issue arises. Formal acknowledgment of the applicability of the APA to Social Security hearings by SSA
raises two fundamental inquiries: (1) What substantive changes to the administrative decision-making process may be wrought by formal acknowledgment
of the applicability of the APA to Social Security proceedings? (2) What
relational changes between SSA administration and its corps of AUs may be
triggered by formal acknowledgment of the APA?
Each question is addressed, briefly, below.
A. What Substantive Changes, If Any, to the Administrative Decision-Making
Process May Be Triggered by Formal Acknowledgment of the Applicability of
the APA to Social Security Proceedings?
Any discussion of formal agency acknowledgment must be prefaced with an
understanding of the legal importance of such recognition. One writer, commenting on the majority opinion in ITT v. IBEW,IV noted that the mere assignment
of an ALJ to hear a case signaled agency acknowledgment of APA applicability."' "This tautological formulation would make the agency's decision
on APA applicability the key to the Court's" own decision on APA applicability."' It is at least consistent, however, with the Court's decision in
United States v. Florida East Coast Railway." In Florida East Coast Railway,
the Court found that while an agency's interpretation of the APA may not be
entitled to the same weight as the agency's interpretation of its own substantive
mandate, "its-characterization of its own proceeding is entitled to weight, and that
characterization may in turn have relevance in determining the applicability of the
Administrative Procedure Act." '

317. Id. at 4.
318. Id. at 5-6.
319. 419 U.S. 428 (1975).
320. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 201. The author stated: "The hallmark of an intermediate
proceeding that requires applicability of the APA's adjudication procedures thus appears to be
acknowledgment by the agency that the particular proceeding is covered by the APA, as shown by the
appointment of an AU to hear it." Id.
321. Id.
322. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
323. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 201.
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This holding is relevant to the issue of APA applicability to SSA ALJs in two
ways: (1) the agency has repeatedly urged APA application in congressional
hearings; and (2) agency utilization of ALJs is, itself, tangible evidence of
consistent agency interpretation of the APA. Formalacknowledgment at this point
in time will not, therefore, change already extant agency policy. APA applicability has been the rule since the inception of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946." Passage of the 1972 SSI amendments crystallized agency policy
into coherent statements before Congress, reaffirming application of the APA to
titles II and XVIII and to then-newly enacted title XVI.
In light of this history, the question becomes, what changes, if any, will be
wrought should the agency again, at the turn of the millennium, formally acknowledge the applicability of the APA? The answer lies both in the past, and, to
some degree, the future.
The issue of APA application to SSA hearing process is important "because the
APA demands that the individual's case be heard and decided by an impartial
trier-of-fact who is not subject to agency control."3 The opposite also holds
true. Adjudication by non-APA hearing officers, who are subject to the control,
direction, performance rating, promotion, and discipline of their employing agency
poses the risk of the potential curtailment of a claimants's due process rights."
"Thus, it is critical to both the interests of the claimant and the Agency that the
hearing fully explore the merits" of an individual case.32' "Given that SSA
hearings are non-adversarial and that the hearing officer has the responsibility to
ensure that the record is complete, the independence of the ALU is an even more
significant factor in this environment than it would be elsewhere.""'
I. Independence
Formal acknowledgment of APA applicability raises a continuing discussion of
the scope of independence expressed in terms of case management (and, correspondingly, the reach of decisional independence) and case assignment.

324. See the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act where it was plainly
stated that "the residual definition of 'adjudication' in section 2(d) was intended to include such
proceedings as ....The determination of claims for money, such as ...claims under... Title II [Old
Age and Survivor's Insurance] of the Social Security Act." TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 15 (1947).
325. COFER,supra note 246, at 139.
326. Id. at 139-40 (citing a position paper prepared by Chester Shatz. U.S. Administrative Law
Judge, filed in the case Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978)).
327. Id. at 140.
328. Id. Ms. Cofer's analysis is appropriate. In an adversarial encounter, the role of the decision

maker is to remain neutral and passive, leaving to the parties the production and elicitation of evidence.
In the inquisitorial model (or, more accurately, the hybrid inquisitorial model) it is the presiding officer
who, while still neutral, is now an active participant in the production and elicitation of a "complete
record." Should such a presiding officer be subject to agency control, it is likely that the record would
only be complete as necessary to meet agency demands - a far cry from the due process standard
Americans have come to expect from their judiciary, administrative or otherwise.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:203

a) Case Management and Decisional Independence
Some commentators argue that independence within the administrative judiciary
is limited to the narrow confines of the ALI's decision, made following an
administrative hearing, to affirm or reverse an earlier administrative determination." Others, however, assert that the decisional nexus extends to the
process of case management because a decision, favorable or otherwise, may be
made at varying points along a continuum.'" This continuum, represented by
a time line extending from the time of the filing of the request for hearing
through submission of post-hearing evidence, defines all potential points at which
the AU may decide a case. The APA, which shields the judge from agency
interference in decision making, lends credence to the argument."'
In the adversarial setting with a district judge, the judge must manage the case
through to completion, setting motions, discovery and other, similar deadlines;
resolving pre-trial disputes between the parties; invoking alternative dispute
resolution procedures; and, finally, setting the case for trial. It is the judge, and
not the parties, who establishes the parameters for case management."'
Similarly, in the administrative setting, the judge must address the ultimate
disposition of the case. Case management in the administrative setting, like that
in the judicial setting, affects critical issues like time to disposition and issues of
record development. However, unlike the adversarial setting where the judge's
role is clear, in the nonadversarial setting, as in Social Security hearings before
ALJs, the lines blur.
Given that case management is a process, such that a decision in a given case
can be made absent a full hearing,3 " the question becomes to what part of that
process does judicial independence extend? Given the regulatory scope of an
AU's activity - extending to both pre-hearing as well as post-hearing inquiry -

329. See, e.g., Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (D.D.C. 1984)
(observing that "on matters of law and policy, however, AUs are entirely subject to the agency").
330. The judge may decide the case favorably without a hearing if the evidence so warrants.
Alternately, if the evidence warrants a favorable decision at a later point in time than requested by the
claimant, the original alleged date of disability may be amended by the claimant and a favorable decision
entered at that point, either before, during, or after a hearing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.948(a). Furthermore, the
claimant may elect not to appear and waive a hearing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.948(b).
331. "The APA creates a comprehensive bulwark to protect AUs from agency interference. The
independence granted to AUs is designed to maintain public confidence in the essential fairness of the
process through which Social Security benefits are allocated by ensuring impartial decision making."
Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1980).
332. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16, which provides for the conduct of pre-trial proceedings to
establish necessary timeliness, due dates, etc. Thus, it is well-settled that a judge, sitting in the judicial
branch, has "inherent authority" to manage his or her caseload, taking into account such factors as
"judicial economy" as a legitimate concern in the case management process.
333. The claimant can waive a personal appearance and ask for a decision based solely on the
written record; or, the judge may conduct pre-hearing conferences, and, upon review of newly submitted
evidence, or in deference to the argument of counsel, render a partially or fully favorable decision (a
reversal, in part; or, an outright reversal of the underlying administrative determination). See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.948, 404.961 (2001).
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decisional independence necessarily embraces the process of case management
through this entire time frame. As one writer put it, "[d]ecisional independence
has two aspects: one more internal, relating to how an individual judge chooses
to function as a judge, and one more external, having to do with practical
circumstances that may enhance or constrain independent and impartial judicial
functioning."' Regulations and case law place sole responsibility upon the ALU
to "look fully into the issues" and ensure that his decision is based upon a fully
developed administrative record."'
Thus, an investigation of the scope of decisional independence in view of
newly adopted hearing office procedures under the "hearing process improvement"
plan is important." Because the judge ultimately retains sole authority to make
decisions in assigned cases, the issue may be viewed as largely academic.
However, given the fact that under HPI cases are not assigned for hearing until
well after the claimant's appeal is filed and docketed, issues may nevertheless be
raised under an APA umbrella." Case assignment is discussed below.
b) Case Assignment and Independence

Perhaps the more critical question is whether current hearing office procedures,
mandated by SSA, and framed under the nomenclature of "hearing process
improvement" or "HPI," follow the APA in the form of case assignment. Title 5,
section 3105 of the APA provides that "[a]dministrative law judges shall be
assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law
judges.""' Additionally, the Bono settlement,'" which arguably constitutes the
agency's interpretation of the APA.' requires that cases be assigned "on a true
rotational basis." " It states that "OHA shall issue a directive to all ALJICs
calling for the assignment to an AL of requests for hearing as soon as they are
received in the Hearing Office on a true rotational basis, to the extent practicable.""

334. Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Part, Present and
Future, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JuDGES 101, 118 (1999).
335. The requirement is that administrative law judges in Social Security "have a duty to develop
afull and fair record." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995).
336. See Social Security Admin. v. Int'l Fed. of Prof. & Tech. Eng'rs, AALS, No. WA-CA-00104
(F.L.R.A. Jan. 31, 2002) (finding that the impact of HPI on the hearing process was "more than de
minimis"). Specifically, the authority found that later assignment of cases to AUs improperly removed
the case from the judge so that he no longer controlled case management prior to hearing).
337. Id.
338. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2000).
339. Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (filed Nov. 16, 1977).
The settlement was executed in its entirety on June 19, 1979.
340. As signified by the agency's agreement, which governed, in-part, the agency's conduct and
relationship with administrative law judges.
341. Id.
342. Id. (emphasis added).
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Current procedures are potentially driven, not by rotational assignment, but by
individual docket setting. While the line may be fine, the issue potentially
resolves itself into one of "retrospective" versus "prospective" docketing - a
practice now being employed in some hearing offices in the wake of HPI
implementation.
Rotational assignment of cases, made on a true rotational basis at the time of
filing a request for hearing, results in retrospective scheduling. With true
rotational assignment, a docket is set only after an appropriate number of cases
are assigned (randomly, or in "true rotation") to a given judge, and the judge then
decides that a docket may be heard.
With prospective scheduling, cases are assigned only after "development" has
been undertaken. 43 "Empty" dockets are selected (usually by location) by a
judge in advance of case assignment. Dockets are then "back-filled" by a judge's
support group. Potential then exists for non-rotational case assignment to
individual judges, dependent upon a judge's advance selection, prior to case
assignment, of otherwise "empty" dockets. A judge who selects more local
dockets, as opposed to out-of-town dockets, or vice-versa, is, by definition,
defeating the concept of random assignment.
Even rotational assignment of hearing locations may fail to satisfy statutorily
mandated rotation of cases, given a judge's prerogative to decline a given location
in a given month once he is satisfied that sufficient numbers of cases have been
assigned. This too, then, becomes a potential issue for discussion under the
APA.0
2. Separation of Functions

The APA requires a separation of function between those who adjudicate and
those who investigate and prosecute."' The 1947 Attorney General's Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act states that "agency officers who performed

investigative or prosecuting functions in that or a factually related case may not
participate in the making of decisions."' HEW's own instruction manual to
Medicare Part B hearing officers (who are appointed by the carriers, but paid
from federal funds) reflects this separation of functions. It states that the hearing
officer "'must not have been involved in any way with the determination in
question and neither have advised nor given consultation on any request for
payment which is a basis for the hearing."'3 4 7

343. Development of the record does not take place under a judge's supervision, but by hearing
office staff, before a case is assigned. Thus, initial case development takes place devoid of judicial
perusal. The judge, however, retains the ability to review a case submitted for scheduling, and determine,
at that point, whether further development is necessary. Development after that time is under the judge's
supervision and this may effectively resolve any question.
344. This depends, to some degree, on the interpretation of the phrase "so far as practicable" found
in § 3105.
345. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000).
346. CLARK, supra note 324, at 15.
347. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.l (1982) (quoting DEP'r OF HEW, MEDICARE
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The premise underlying the separation of functions requirement is straightforward - to provide a fair and impartial determination, and not one which is
prejudged. A fair and impartial result would be nearly impossible with adjudication by one who had served as a prosecutor or an investigator in the same
caseY The principle that any hearing must be a fair and open hearing is a
fundamental part of American jurisprudence?
This essential requirement for a just determination has manifested itself in an
extensive body of ethical considerations, finding life in the APA through the
separation of functions rule. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath," the Supreme
Court found that one of the two major purposes underlying the APA was "to
curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties
of prosecutor and judge. '35
' Indeed, the House Ways and Means Committee
agreed, stating that "due process requires that the person who takes evidence and
makes the decision be impartial, that the trier of fact cannot be prosecutor in the
same matter, and that he cannot have been involved in the matter previously as
an agency staff person."" 2 The committee staff report also acknowledged that
"[t]hese also are requirements of the APA ....
These considerations become significant in light of the unique adjudicatory
functions of A1ls who preside over Social Security proceedings. In the absence
of the Government as a party and given the regulatory duty imposed on the AU
to fully and fairly develop the record, a question arises as to whether there is a
separation of functions violation. Specifically, is the APA violated by a neutral
and impartial decision maker who must discover (i.e., personally investigate
and/or superintend the investigatory function) evidence which is both contrary to
the claimant and the Government?
In Withrow v. Larkin,"' the Supreme Court determined that "the mere
exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is
insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later
PART B CARRIERS MANUAL ch. X11 (1980)).
348. See Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995). The Ventura court held: "Essential
to a fair hearing is the right to an unbiased judge. The due process requirement of an impartial
decisionmaker is applied more strictly in administrative proceedings than in court proceedings because
of the absence of procedural safeguards normally available in judicial proceedings." id. Also, "[t]his
'separation of functions' requirement is designed to prevent the investigative or prosecutorial arm of an
agency from controlling a hearing or influencing the AU." Jeffrey S. Lubbers. FederalAdministrative
Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111-12 (1981).
349. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 175. Professor Rosenblum notes:
A full hearing must be a fair and open hearing. Those who are brought into contest
with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities
are entitled to be fairly advised of what the government proposes and to be heard upon
its proposals before it issues its final command.
Id.
350. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
351. RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 179.
352. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 36, at 7.
353. Id.
354. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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adversary hearing. ' 35 Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the
Social Security AU, who is required, in the words of the Peralescourt, to wear
"three hats," is acting in violation of the separation of functions provisions of the
APA? The PeralesCourt seemingly answered this question. The Court stated that
they were not "persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple hat suggestion. It
assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and
working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity.""'
However, the issue remains a potentially open question given the dramatic
changes in the hearings and appeals process. While very few claimants were
represented by counsel in the Perales era," more than 90% are now
represented,"" with attorney's fees contingent upon a win. Likened to the inquisitorial system prevalent in continental Europe,'" hearings before SSA's
Office of Hearings and Appeals, involve an adversarialopponent (who is paid
only upon a win), and no counter-balancing opponent (party). There is a
significant, possibly unconscious, temptation for the judge to engage in counterbalancing and thus skew neutrality.'
Formal acknowledgment of APA applicability highlights the conundrum of the
"judge who wears Three Hats." The Government Representation Project, in which
government counsel actually appeared at Social Security hearings, while
seemingly an attempt to reduce time to disposition actually struck a more certain

355. Id. at 52.
356. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
357. "To describe this phenomenon there has come into use the metaphor of the Three Hats,
explained in the following opening statement of a Hearing Examiner in a hearing: 'Let me say this maybe I can ease your mind. In 99% of the cases, people come in without any representation."' Viles,
supra note 89, at 40.
358. See supra note 89, wherein SSA indicates that the rate of representation nationally was "nearly
80%" in 1986.
359. "The Court approved the ,so-called 'three-hat' administrative law judge (claimant representative,
government representative, and neutral decider), whose conduct has been seen to emulate that of [the]
inquisitorial judge in continental countries." Verkuil, supra note 24, at 286.
360. Karen Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model
Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 537, 546 (1985). Even in 1968, the
issue was perceived as problematic:
The overriding difficulty for the Examiner who wears his Three Hats seriously is not the
immediate and visible function of asking questions in a hearing. It lies instead in the ultimately impossible task of simultaneously or consecutively building the best possible case
for the claimant by discovering, interpreting, construing, organizing, and presenting
infinitely variable evidence most favorable to his [the claimant's] position; of similarly
making the best case for the Administration, which has denied the claim; and then of
impartially finding a winner....
In doing so the claimant's attorney has knocked the Three Hats; askew and revealed the
proceeding for what it really is. Either the Examiner responds to his [the attorney's]
advocacy by treating it as a judicial or adversarial process, in which under one fewer Hat
he moves to the no less comfortable position of representing the Administration and
deciding impartially at the same time, or he retreats into the decision-making framework
of the administrative adjudicator ...[and] he simply fails to respond to the advocacy.
Viles, supra note 89, at 42-43.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss2/3

2002]

THE APA, ALJs, AND SSA

note. SSA's responses to questions from the Subcommittee on Social Security of
the House Ways and Means Committee are telling. The hearings indicate that
"SSA representatives have been extremely successful in relieving ALJs of much
of the work of prehearing case development and in ensuring greater consistency
in case development practices. '
A two-party proceeding appeared to alleviate the conflict under the Three Hat
paradigm. SSA commented that "[t]here is evidence that SSA representation
might well reduce subsequent litigation ... [with] a reduction of more than 30
percent in the rate of error for denial decisions.""e SSA applauded the project
as
improving our ability to issue timely, accurate, and consistent hearing
decisions in the face of circumstances that differ substantially from
those contemplated when the process was designed in the early
1940's. The circumstances... differ from those that existed for many
years in two fundamental ways: caseloads are far greater (more than
twice as great even as those of only 10 years ago) and the rate of
claimant representation is high (nearly 80 percent of all hearings held
nationally).'
In this last statement, SSA captures the essence of the need for change. In an
era in which well over 90% of claimants are represented, and in which the
attorney's fee is contingent upon award of benefits, the Three Hat conundrum is
exacerbated. Severe ethical issues arise in a system, albeit nonadversarial, where
counsel is required to supply evidence which is arguably against the best interests
of his client.' Ultimately, the question becomes one of procedural due process.
Is fundamental fairness undermined in a single-party system in which the judicial
officer is an "active" source of evidence, in effect, representing the interests of
the Government?'
Unfortunately, the Government Representation Project floundered in the wake
of an adverse district court decision. However, the fact remains that formal
recognition of the APA as applicable to Social Security hearings may properly
herald the return of a two-party proceeding in which the AUJ is returned to his
traditional role in Anglo-American jurisprudence.'

361. Current Problems, supra note 117, at 84.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
364. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(2) (2001), which requires, inter alia, "[a] representative
shall ... (2) Assist the claimant in complying, as soon as practicable, with our requests for information
or evidence at any stage of the administrative decisionmaking process .
365. See generally Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 90, at 293.
366. A necessary corollary to this is removal of the "duty to develop the .record" from the
administrative law judge; returning it to the Government, whence it properly belongs. If a claimant is
unable to obtain needed information or medical testing to document his or her disability, she can then
move the Government for assistance. If opposed, the judge would then decide.
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B. What Relational Changes Between SSA Administration and Its Corps of
Administrative Law Judges May Be Triggered by Formal Acknowledgment of
the Administrative ProcedureAct?
'SSA administration must inevitably address the question whether to formally
acknowledge APA applicability. The issue can be approached, addressed, and
analyzed in the context of the preceding twenty-five years, beginning with the socalled Trachtenberg Era." A review of the past twenty-five years will likely
reflect continued attempts at management and control by SSA administration,
resulting in continued political tensions. In fact, little has changed over the past
quarter century.'
The end result of such an undertaking is problematic, at best. For managers and
administrators, predictability of outcome is equivalent to predictability of budget.
For judges, each case stands alone in the signal light of individual facts - in the
face of individual need. Cases cannot be decided on the basis of trends, budget
predictions, or national fiscal planning. Instead, the American people demand a
fundamentally fair opportunity to reverse an otherwise negative administrative
decision. Such proceedings require individual consideration and uniform application
of the law, tempered with justice.
A proceeding whose results cannot be predicted or controlled is characterized as
fundamentally fair. Foundationally, American government is an expression of the
will of the people as a whole. Public service cannot be denigrated by the failure to
account for essential principles of democracy undergirding such activity. Public
service embodies the public trust - a fiduciary relationship - whose commitment
is to the integrity of the relationship of an individual to his government.
To continue in the previously established pattern can only lead to a continuing
montage of piecemeal justice and fragmented policy. Professors Susan Haire and
Stefanie Lindquist note with alacrity that SSA, in its present operation, "is subjected
to widely varying degrees of support among the circuits. And the infrequency with
which the Supreme Court reviews disability cases has meant that little has been
done to cohere the standards or approaches of the circuits."'

367. See COFER. supra note 246, at 75.
368. A report to the Civil Service Commission from the Conference of Federal Administrative Law
Judges in December 1973 illustrates the problem: "[Algency management personnel typically reject the
argument that the administrative law judge is charged with unique functions, responsibilities, and status
under the APA. They seek therefore to impose upon judges usual agency control systems that are, in
fact, inappropriate, costly and unnecessary if not altogether illegal." RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105,
at 240-41.
369. Susan Haire & Stefanie Lindquist, An Agency and Twelve Courts: Social Security Disability
Cases in the United States Courts of Appeal, 80 JUDICATURE 230, 236 (1997). On this point, Professor
Rosenblum notes:
The tensions that exist between the Agency and reviewing courts account for serious
dissonance and disarray in the application of Social Security law and received no
consideration or analysis in the (19971 General Counsel's memorandum beyond the
insistence that an AU is bound to follow Agency policy, even if, in the AU's opinion,
the policy in contrary to law.
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In one writer's view, appellate courts' negative perceptions of the impartiality of
ALJs is at the heart of "appellate judges' readiness to challenge or refute Agency
decisions."' The agency's stalwart insistence upon adherence to agency policy "in
the face of overt court rulings to the contrary" has led to "rulings such as the Fourth
Circuit's that federal agencies 'are required to abide by the law of this court in
matters arising within the jurisdiction of this circuit until and unless it is changed
by this court or reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.""'37 Indeed,
in 1998 the Fourth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus against a government agency,
declaring that "a policy argument bottomed on an agency's view of expediency can
never justify an agency's disregard of the existing mandate of a federal court in
which the agency was a party litigant. "3' In fact, "SSA's genuine problem is with
its relationship with the reviewing courts, not with compliance by its ALJs with its
'
policies."373
. Agency policy, as reflected in decisions denying benefits, is particularly at issue.
In those instances, the agency agreed with its judges that benefits should be denied.
Where those cases were reversed or remanded, it was the federal court, not the ALJ
who disagreed with agency outcomes. Yet, great struggles continue to exist between
SSA and its ALJs. SSA has put forth little effort to bridge the gap, apart from
continuing a policy of "nonacquiescence" with the federal courts.
How would such a relationship function? Professor Rosenblum has suggested that
A collegial approach to SSA-ALJ ties could commence ideally with
tabling the Fried memorandum and with instituting colloquia among
Agency officials and AL~s on key administrative procedure issues that
highlight and compare federal agencies' experiences with court reversals
and remands. Monitoring and assessing courts' actions and rationales especially those that delay and impede putting closure on impartially
administered and adjudged SSA cases, warrant systematic analyses and
consideration of alternative responses through interactions of the
experienced, skilled minds of the ALJ corps and those of management
officials."
Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 64-65.
370. Id. at 65 n.29.
371. Id. (quoting Indus. Turn Around Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997)).

372. Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 135 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 1998), overruled by FCC v. Iowa
Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 1133 (1999).
373. Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 68. Professor Rosenblum notes:
These recent examples of divergence between courts of appeals and the Agency were
especially noteworthy because the AUs and the Agency were in agreement in every
instance. SSA's genuine problem is with its relationship with reviewing courts, not with

compliance by its ALJs with its policies. Instead of preoccupation with AUs' conformity
to Agency policy, SSA would do well to implement a collegial relationship with its AUs
and to enlist them as the professional, impartial colleagues they are in heightening courts
of appeals' understanding of, coordination with and deference to the records and findings
of the AUs and the Agency.
Id. (emphasis added).
374. Id. at 68-69.
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Formal recognition of the applicability of the APA would signal the end of the
Trachtenberg Era " and the beginning of a renewed opportunity for constructive

collegiality, marked by mutual respect and professionalism. Formal APA recognition
would trigger an affirmative effort by the agency to trust the impartial judgment of
its administrative law judge corps. Such trust potentially engenders a like response

from the courts."
The challenge lies in defining the undertaking. Ending the Trachtenberg legacy
in favor of professional collegiality requires a mutual change in culture." Critical
issues facing a growing disability adjudication system must be addressed equally by
both SSA administration and members of the administrative judiciary. Recognition
of the applicability of the APA holds great promise for a different future than that
charted by the directives of the past twenty-five years.
VIII. Conclusion

On January 9, 2001, by letter to AUJ Ron Bemowski," president of the
Association of Administrative Law Judges, then-Commissioner Kenneth Apfel
responded to the question first asked. The Commissioner's letter is found at
Appendix A.

375. See COFER, supra note 246, at 75.
376. Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 69. Professor Rosenblum notes:
Deference to their construction of their governing statutes is a wise and effective policy
for courts to follow vis a vis administrative agencies. But deference has typically been
earned as a product of trust
and respect. The Chevron doctrine has its roots in the
feasibility of trust between courts and administrative agencies. A major producer of trust
is a pervasive record of adherence to highest standards of impartiality.
Id. (emphasis added).
377. The atmosphere of continuing tension has resulted in a failure to achieve even basic solutions
to the dilemmas facing an increasingly overburdened agency. As Professor Rosenblum aptly noted:
"What is needed, then, is not greater subjection of hearing officers to agency controls but,
as the staff report points out, greater encouragement of the agencies "to promulgate
precedent materials, particularly regulations on the non-medical and vocational factors in
disability evaluation." The failure to develop such materials in the past "has caused many
varied interpretations of the law and, to a large degree, policy setting by judicial
interpretation."
RECENT STUDIES, supra note 105, at 219.
378. On file with the author.
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APPENDIX A

SOCIAL SECURITY
Office of the Commissioner
January 9,2001

Mr. Ronald 0. Bemoski
Administrative Law Judge
Room 880
310 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53203
Dear Judge Bemoski:
Last fall, a question arose at the Administrative Law Judge (AL) Training Conference about
applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to hearings conducted by Social Security
ALls.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has a long tradition, since the beginning of the Social
Security programs during the 1930s, of providing the full measure of due proceo for people who
apply for or who receive Social Security benefits. An individual who is dissatisfied with the
determination that SSA has made with respect to his or her claim for benefits has a right to
request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, an independent decisionmaker who
makes a de novo decision with respect to the individual's claim for benefits. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, SSA's procedures for handling claims in which a hearing has been
requested served as the model for the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Congress passed the
APA in 1946 in part to establish uniform standards for certain adjudicatory proceedings in
Federal agencies, in order to ensure that individuals receive a fair hearing on their claims before
an independent decisionmaker. SSA always has supported the APA and is proud that the SSA
hearing process has become the model under which all Federal agencies that hold hearings
subject to the APA operate. SSA's hearing process provides the protections set-forth in the
APA, and SSA's Administrative Law Judges are appointed in compliance with the provisions of
the APA.
I trust this is responsive to the question that was raised.
Sincerely,

Commissioner
of Social Security

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

BALTIMORE MD 212M-O00
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